The Pentagon Labyrinth

aims to help both newcomers and seasoned observers learn how to grapple with the problems of national defense. Intended for readers who are frustrated with the super/ficial nature of the debate on national security, this handbook takes advantage of the insights of ten unique professionals, each with decades of experience in the armed services, the Pentagon bureaucracy, Congress, the intelligence community, military history, journalism and other disciplines. The short but provocative essays will help you to:

• identify the decay—moral, mental and physical—in America’s defenses,
• understand the various “tribes” that run bureaucratic life in the Pentagon,
• appreciate what too many defense journalists are not doing, but should,
• conduct first rate national security oversight instead of second rate theater,
• separate careerists from ethical professionals in senior military and civilian ranks,
• learn to critique strategies, distinguishing the useful from the agenda-driven,
• recognize the pervasive influence of money in defense decision-making,
• unravel the budget games the Pentagon and Congress love to play,
• understand how to sort good weapons from bad—and avoid high cost failures,
• reform the failed defense procurement system without changing a single law.

The handbook ends with lists of contacts, readings and Web sites carefully selected to facilitate further understanding of the above, and more.

From 10 Pentagon Insiders, Retired Military Officers and Specialists with Over 400 Years of Defense Experience

Straus Military Reform Project
Center for Defense Information
The
Pentagon
Labyrinth

10 Short Essays to Help You Through It

From 10 Pentagon Insiders, Retired Military Officers and Specialists
With Over 400 Years of Defense Experience

Edited by Winslow T. Wheeler

Center for Defense Information
World Security Institute
February 2011
Suggested Contacts, Readings and Web Sites

Contacts

Contact the various authors of this handbook at the following e-mail addresses:

Thomas Christie: tchristie34@verizon.net
Andrew Cockburn: amcockburn@gmail.com
Bruce Gudmundsson: trosknecht@yahoo.com
Chet Richards: FuentesDeOnoro@me.com
Franklin C. Spinney: chuck.spinney@gmail.com
Pierre M. Sprey: Pierre@mapleshaderecords.com
Winslow Wheeler: winslowwheeler@msn.com
George Wilson: gewilson1@comcast.net
G.I. Wilson: wilsongi@aol.com

Readings

Each of the authors was asked to recommend readings; what follows is our compilation. Annotations in quotes are excerpts from various materials at Amazon.com. Comments by various authors are identified as such or simply lack quotation marks.

Human Conflict

Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (Little, Brown and Company, 2002). “John Boyd (1927-1997) was a brilliant and blazingly eccentric person. He was a crackerjack jet fighter pilot, a visionary scholar and an innovative military strategist. Among other things, Boyd wrote the first manual on jet aerial combat, was primarily responsible for designing the F-15 and the F-16 jet fighters, was a leading voice in the post-Vietnam War military reform movement and shaped the smashingly successful U.S. military strategy in the Persian Gulf War. His writings and theories on military strategy remain influential today, particularly his concept of the ‘OODA (Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action) Loop,’ which all the military services-and many business strategists-use to this day. Boyd also was a brash, combative, iconoclastic man, not above insulting his superiors at the Pentagon (both military and civilian); he made enemies (and fiercely loyal acolytes) everywhere he went…."

For a concise summary of Boyd’s work, see the entry below.

Grant T. Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security (Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001). “Breakthrough biography of a revolutionary thinker who transformed American military policy and practice. Based on extensive interviews with Boyd and with those who knew him, The Mind of War is the first biography of this pivotal figure in American military history.”

Col. Chet Richards, Certain to Win: The Strategy of John Boyd Applied to Business (Center for Defense Information, 2004). “Develops the strategy of the late US Air Force Colonel John R. Boyd for the world of business. Robert Coram's monumental biography, Boyd, the Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, rekindled interest in this obscure pilot and documented his influence on military matters ranging from the design of the F-15 and F-16 fighters to the planning for Operation Desert Storm….”

Find the major elements of Boyd’s work at http://dnipogo.org/john-r-boyd/, including Boyd’s Discourse on Winning and Losing, which includes his Patterns of Conflict, Strategic Game of ? and ?, Organic Design for Command and Control, and The Essence of Winning and Losing. Boyd's methods, as he explained them in Discourse and other materials, enable people—from a single individual to an alliance of nations—to orient themselves to external challenges and opportunities, create options, take actions and exploit their effects before their opponents can understand and react effectively. In order to do this, Boyd explained, they employ certain active and passive measures to keep their common implicit orientation better harmonized both among themselves and with external reality than their opponents.

Find various YouTube videos of sections of John Boyd briefings and materials about him (of varying quality) at http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=John+Boyd&aq=f.

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ed. and trans. John Minford (Penguin Books, 2002). “The Art of War is among the greatest classics of military literature ever written. Sun Tzu warfare is as applicable today as when the book was written some 2,500 years ago...Pick up The Art of War and read it.” – Gen. A.M. Gray, former U.S. Marine Corps commandant, Marine Corps Gazette.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Multiple publications and publishers). “Written two centuries ago by a Prussian military thinker, this is the most frequently cited, the most controversial, and in many ways, the most modern book on
warfare. The author fought against the armies of the French Revolution and Napoleon, served as a staff officer, and became a prominent military educator. In this work, he examines moral and psychological aspects of warfare, stressing the necessity of courage, audacity and self-sacrifice, as well as the importance of morale and public opinion. He emphasizes the notion of strategy as an evolving plan, rather than a formula, a concept adaptable to modern strategists in fields beyond military science.”

People

Robert D. Hare and Paul Babiak, *Snakes In Suits: When Psychopaths Go to Work* (Collins Business, 2006). “Psychopaths are described as incapable of empathy, guilt, or loyalty to anyone but themselves; still, spotting a psychopath isn't easy…A common description of psychopathology states that subjects ‘know the words but not the music;’ Babiak and Hare state that ‘a clever psychopath can present such a well-rounded picture of a perfect job candidate that even seasoned interviewers’ can be fooled…to illuminate the power of the psychopath to manipulate those around him, as well as what strategies can be used to identify and disarm him.”

Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Houghton Mifflin, 1983). “Janis defines groupthink as the ‘deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment’ in the interest of group solidarity. Pressure to conform…Group members tend to show strong favoritism toward their own ideas in the manner by which information is processed and evaluated, thus guaranteeing that their ideas will win out.”

Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character* (Scribner, 1985). “War…generates rage because of its intrinsic unfairness. Only one's special comrades can be trusted. The death of Patroklos drove Achilles first into passionate grief, then into berserk wrath. Shay establishes convincing parallels to combat in Vietnam, where the war was considered meaningless and mourning for dead friends was thwarted by an indifferent command structure...recommends policies of unit rotation and unit “griefwork”—official recognition of combat losses—as keys to sustaining…a moral existence during war's human encounters. The alternatives are unrestrained revenge-driven behavior, endless reliving of the guilt such behavior causes and the ruin of good character.”

Jonathan Shay, *Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming* (Scribner, 2003). “…uses Odysseus's epic journey to explore the stresses faced by veterans who return home, still scarred by their intense experiences…Odysseus experienced nearly all of the symptoms he has observed
in returned veterans of modern wars: fearfulness, inability to trust or be close to anyone, emotional outbursts, violence, criminal activity, sexual adventurism, and so forth…deals with healing techniques…[and] suggested measures for prevention of such long-lasting injuries…”

Martin van Creveld, *Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939–1945* (Greenwood Press, 1982). “…analyzes the ways in which the WWII German Army developed the fighting power that allowed them to achieve a number of military victories even when outnumbered and using outdated equipment. He compares and contrasts the Germans with the U.S. Army, which developed a different style of war based on superior economic and technological resources.”


Maj. Donald Vandergriff, U.S. Army, ret., *Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing Face of War* (Center for Defense Information, 2006). “’Adaptability’ has become a buzzword throughout the U.S. Army due to experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq…The Army recognizes that in order to move toward becoming a ‘learning organization’ where leaders practice adaptability, it will have to change its culture, particularly its leader development paradigm.”

Maj. Donald Vandergriff, U.S. Army, ret., *Manning the Future Legions of the United States: Finding and Developing Tomorrow's Centurions* (Praeger, 2008). “…looks beyond recruiting. It is a holistic view of today's Army and addresses the fact that in order to effectively recruit the soldiers and leaders of the future, the nation needs to take the Army—its personnel management system and structure—from the Industrial Age into the Information Age.”

George C. Wilson, *Mud Soldiers: Life Inside the New American Army* (Collier Books, 1991). “Wilson became increasingly critical of the Army as he accompanied a group of volunteers through basic and advanced infantry training and their first field maneuver; mishandled trainees, improper protection during exercises and four suicide attempts led him to recommend program changes.”

**The Pentagon and Military Reform**

James G. Burton, *The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard* (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1993). “…testifies that the process of selecting and
purchasing weapons for our armed forces is ‘ethically and morally corrupt from top to bottom,’ with few checks and balances. The most scathing and damning portions of the expose illustrate how Pentagon procurement officers routinely give more consideration to satisfying defense contractors than to the safety of the troops who will use a given weapon on the field…” Also contains an epilogue explaining how the Republican Guard was allowed to escape at the end of the First Gulf War, thereby enabling Saddam Hussein’s regime to survive—necessitating the Second Gulf War.


Andrew Cockburn, Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy (Scribner, 2007). “Relying on sources that include high-ranking officials in the Pentagon and the White House, Rumsfeld goes far beyond previous accounts to reveal a man consumed with the urge to dominate each and every human encounter, and whose aggressive ambition has long been matched by his inability to display genuine leadership or accept responsibility for egregious error…Cockburn reveals how Rumsfeld's habits of intimidation, indecision, ignoring awkward realities, destructive micromanagement and bureaucratic manipulation all helped doom America's military adventure.”


Ernest Fitzgerald, The High Priests of Waste (Norton, 1972).; Ernest Fitzgerald, The Pentagonists: An Insider’s View of Waste, Mismanagement and Fraud in Defense Spending (Houghton Mifflin, 1989). These two volumes are “Ernie” Fitzgerald’s descriptions of the obstacles he met when trying to expose waste and fraud in the Pentagon. His efforts earned him numerous efforts by his superiors, including Richard Nixon, to fire him—all of them unsuccessful.


the challenges of WWII: Hans Von Seckt, B. H. Liddell Hart, Charles de Gaulle, and Heinz Guderian. Macgregor presents the first coherent view of how the information age should transform the way we organize for war…takes to task the leadership culture that stifles change…” – ARMOR Magazine.

Andrew Pasztor, When the Pentagon Was for Sale: Inside America's Biggest Defense Scandal (Scribner, 1995). “Pasztor's examination of Pentagon and arms-industry corruption exposes the process by which such giant defense contractors as Boeing, General Electric and United Technologies illegally obtained contracts with the cooperation of Pentagon officials throughout the Reagan years…tracks the criminal investigations and prosecution of defense suppliers and Pentagon officials during the Justice Department's Operation Illwind…he maintains that very little has changed to improve day-to-day accountability, and the Pentagon's own rules and regulations continue implicitly to encourage wrongdoing.”


Col. Chet Richards, A Swift Elusive Sword: What if Sun Tzu and John Boyd Did a National Defense Review? (Center for Defense Information, 2001). “…suggests that ancient strategic wisdom may help solve the dilemma confronting the U.S. military: spending on defense exceeds that of any combination of potential adversaries, but the services still face cancellation of weapon systems and lack of funds for training, spares, and care and feeding of the troops. Richards suggests U.S. military leaders can break out of the ‘dollars equals defense’ mindset, and create more effective forces…”

Franklin C. Spinney, Defense Facts of Life: The Plans/Reality Mismatch (Westview Press, 1985). “Well-documented and well-illustrated account of how virtually every single weapons and mobility system now in the Pentagon system is over-priced, over-weight, over-budget, and not able to perform as advertised…[T]he author is very effectively demonstrating that doctrine, technology and the budget are completely divorced from both real world threats, and real world logistics…”

Some of the other works by “Chuck” Spinney are listed below. These briefings, essays and articles (and Spinney’s book listed above) contemporaneously document the affirmation that today's defense problems are no accident and could have been, indeed were, foreseen. Moreover, all of the problems could have been mitigated or avoided by senior management in the Pentagon or by Congress if either had the character to orient to what was best for the country
rather than what was best for political and bureaucratic careers, and membership in good standing in elite decision-making circles.


“…describes how America's armed forces are manned and equipped to fight, at best, enemies that do not now—and may never again—exist and to combat real enemies ineffectively at high human and material cost…Over time, policy makers of all political stripes have created budgets that have made our forces smaller, less well equipped, and less ready to fight—all at dramatically increasing cost. Fortunately, the book's authors offer ‘real-world’ solutions to all the problems they identify…” Stanford University Press has permitted three chapters of the anthology to be downloadable at the Labyrinth websites: find Col. Chet Richards’ chapter on strategy at http://pogoarchives.org/labyrinth/11/01.pdf; Col. G.I. Wilson’s and Maj. Don Vandergriff’s chapter on people issues at http://pogoarchives.org/labyrinth/11/02.pdf, and Col. Bob Dilger’s and Pierre Sprey’s chapter on air power at http://pogoarchives.org/labyrinth/11/03.pdf.

Winslow T. Wheeler and Lawrence J. Korb, Military Reform: An Uneven History and an Uncertain Future (Stanford Security Studies, 2009). “establish[es] a definition of what genuine military reform is and is not, and [identifies] what really needs to be done to transform our military. They compare genuine reform with ‘cosmetic dabbling’—that improves nothing and often burdens US combat forces to the point of mental and physical immobility…”

George C. Wilson, This War Really Matters: Inside the Fight for Defense Dollars (Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000). “Drawing on nearly 40 years of news writing focused on military issues, George C. Wilson takes the reader through a fascinating, but little understood, process: how the Pentagon and Congress spend $500,000 a minute on guns and soldiers. Interweaving personal stories and insights from the major players…, Wilson provides an inside look at how the 105th Congress and the Pentagon battled for a 250 billion dollar defense budget.”

Conventional and Maneuver Warfare

Larry H. Addington, Patterns of War through the Eighteenth Century (Indiana University Press, 1990).; Larry H. Addington, Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century (Indiana University Press, 1994). Bruce Gudmundsson describes both as an excellent overview of the evolution of the Western way of war. The second volume, which deals with the past two centuries, is more detailed, and provides an excellent companion to The American Way of War (see below).

describes this as the single best description of the way that the various armed services look at the world—an indispensable tool for anyone who finds himself working with any of the armed services.

James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay, *A Quick and Dirty Guide to War: Briefings on Present and Potential Wars* (Paladin Press, 2008). Bruce Gudmundsson describes this as an excellent introduction to the wars of the past 30 years or so. True to its title, this book is a lively work aimed at a broad audience, and is thus well suited to someone new to the subject.

Trevor N. Dupuy, *A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807–1945* (Military Book Club, 1977). There are many books that competently address the organizational concepts and the “styles of warfare” that the Germans adopted beginning in the 19th century and that were refined late in World War I and shortly thereafter—thereby laying the basis for the extraordinarily successful “blitzkrieg” form of warfare that Germany’s World War II opponents had to attempt to emulate and adapt to in order to compete. Dupuy’s book listed here is one of several that are available.


Ernst Junger, *Storm of Steel.* (Penguin, 2002). A World War I memoir by a young German officer who, survived the front line on the western front all the way through. It is a searing depiction of modern war, and it is an indispensable source on trench warfare and the tactics evolved by the Germans in dealing with it.

William S. Lind, *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* (Westview Special Studies in Military Affairs, 1985). “Maneuver warfare, often controversial and requiring operational and tactical innovation, poses perhaps the most important doctrinal questions currently facing the conventional military forces of the U.S. Its purpose is to defeat the enemy by disrupting the opponent's ability to react, rather than by physical destruction of forces…The authors translate concepts too often vaguely stated by maneuver warfare advocates into concrete doctrine.”

and captains who fought and won the battle. The other is a story of failed generalship, one that explains why Iraq's Republican Guard escaped, ensuring that Saddam Hussein's regime survived and America's war with Iraq dragged on. Certain to provoke debate, this is the latest book from the controversial and influential military veteran whose two previous books, *Breaking the Phalanx* and *Transformation Under Fire*, are credited with influencing thinking and organization inside America's ground forces and figure prominently in current discussions about military strategy and defense policies.”

Bruce Porter, *War and the Rise of the State* (Free Press, 2002). Bruce Gudmundsson describes it as laying out the interrelationship between the rise of the state as an institution and the way that wars have been fought in the past five centuries. In doing so, it makes the classic argument that the modern state and modern armies grew in tandem and that, in particular, the welfare state is largely a product of the total wars of the 20th century.

Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Indiana University Press, 1977). The book argues that there are two distinct traditions in the way the United States fights wars, one based upon maneuver and the other upon the massive application of firepower. In the course of doing this, it also provides an accessible introduction to American military history.

**Insurgency and Fourth Generation Warfare**

Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History* (Doubleday, 1975). “… survey of guerrilla warfare begins with the struggle between Persian king Darius and Scythian irregulars and concludes with the mujahedin resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He discusses how great commanders such as Hannibal and Napoleon dealt with irregulars and how counterinsurgency experts such as Sir Gerald Templar during the Malayan Emergency in the early 1950s found ways to defeat the guerrilla.”

Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone* (Zenith Press, 2004). A classic, this is one of several contemporary quality analyses available on insurgent warfare.

T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph* (Anchor, 1991). This is another classic description of insurgent warfare. Advocates of “Fourth Generation War” as something entirely new are well advised to review T. E. Lawrence’s descriptions of it in the First World War.

includes a prediction of the emergence—more than 10 years later—of what has become known as “Fourth Generation War.”


“…insurgencies throughout history, beginning with America's own struggle for independence...Polk explores the role of insurgency in other notable conflicts—including the Spanish guerrilla war against Napoleon, the Irish struggle for independence, the Algerian War of National Independence, and Vietnam—eventually landing at the ongoing campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the lessons of this history are needed more than ever.”

John H. Poole, A series of books: The Last Hundred Yards; One More bridge to Cross; Phantom Soldier; The Tiger's Way; Tactics of the Crescent Moon; Militant Tactics; Terrorist Trails; Dragon Days; Expeditionary Eagles; Homeland Siege; Tequila Junction. “The entire Poole series, beginning with The Last Hundred Yards . . . through his most recent Tequila Junction . . . provide unique insight into terrorists, insurgents, and guerrillas that is underappreciated within defense and security hierarchies.” –Counterterrorist Magazine, January 2009. “John Poole has written a thought-provoking and intriguing work in Tequila Junction. He has masterfully made the case for attention and action toward threats being ignored due to our myopic focus on Islamic extremism. This is another exceptional volume to add to his superb collection of works dealing with the new forms of conflict we face.” –Gen. Anthony C. Zinni USMC (Ret.), June 2008

Col. Douglas Macgregor writes as follows on this series: Poole's 'series' involve light infantry tactics and techniques at the squad level and sometimes at the platoon level. Though his work at the squad and platoon level has value, it should stay at that level. Nothing of what he writes is applicable to modern warfare involving opponents with the capability to fight back…. Poole's principle mistake is in believing improvement at the light infantry squad or platoon level will lead American forces to victory in the so called 4GW and counterinsurgency…. Given that we now live in an age of extreme battlefield lethality, the approach Poole advocates is terribly archaic and dangerous. It promises to produce heavy casualties against any enemy with capability above small arms. History demonstrates repeatedly that light infantry has no chance against modern armored forces. We saw this in the Pacific with the Imperial Japanese Army where the pathetic Sherman tank and American air power devastated the Japanese forces. We also saw it during the initial failure of the US and ROK ground forces defending against tank units of the North Korean army….In the end firepower, mobility, and armored protection, the holy trinity of offensive military power in land warfare, is decisive. When augmented with effective strikes from the air, it is irresistible….In summary, Poole is selling dangerous snake oil and miracle cures that don't exist. Poole's approach may
seem to promise savings in defense spending to those who just want to cut spending, but it's a guaranteed loser in a real war with real armies, real air forces, and real air defenses. Buyer beware!

Col. Chet Richards, U.S. Air Force, ret., *Neither Shall the Sword: Conflict in the Years Ahead* (Center for Defense Information, 2006). “Despite spending on defense that equals the rest of the world, combined, and initiating a war in Iraq that will likely surpass Vietnam in cost, the United States has yet either to destroy al-Qaeda or to defeat a group of ragtag insurgents concentrated in the areas around Baghdad. The U.S. Department of Defense…is not only unsuited for this new form of conflict, it cannot be transformed into an organization that is.”

Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (The Free Press, 1991). “Most wars since 1945 have been low-intensity conflicts and, according to the author, incomparably more significant than conventional wars in terms of casualties suffered and political results achieved…Van Creveld, who teaches history at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, argues that the theories of Karl von Clausewitz, which form the basis for Western strategic thought, are largely irrelevant to nonpolitical wars such as the Islamic jihad and wars for existence such as Israel's Six-Day War...Weapons will become less, rather than more, sophisticated and the high-tech weapons industry (which ‘supports itself by exporting its own uselessness’) will collapse like a house of cards...”

**Intelligence**


Andrew Cockburn, *The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine* (Random House, 1983). Cockburn’s analysis of how the U.S. intelligence community ignored readily available data to assess actual Soviet military capabilities—choosing instead to cooperate with politically directed “threat inflation”—pertains to the bygone era of the Cold War. However, the book remains most relevant today for understanding how contemporary threats can remain so poorly understood (and in many cases highly inflated beyond their actual capabilities).

The Codebreakers focuses on the 20th century, especially World War II. But its reach is long. Kahn traces cryptology's origins to the advent of writing.

Weapons and Technology

Thomas S. Amlie, “Radar: Shield or Target,” IEEE Spectrum, April 1982. Amlie points out in this seminal article that what many think to be a key to effectiveness in military technology (radar) also has many limitations and negative trade-offs: Like a flashlight at night, the Aegis radar can see, but it can be seen, and tracked, from much further. Available at http://pogoarchives.org/labyrinth/11/10.pdf.

Government Accountability Office (GAO), Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign, June 1997, U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-97-134. Not easy-to-read and poorly organized, the appendices of this 200-page analysis of the air campaign of the First Gulf War are crammed with Air Force and Navy data to assess the actual—not hyped—performance of high- and low-tech systems in that air war. Virtually all of the impressive claims in favor of extraordinary performance of “precision,” high-tech systems—and especially of a “revolution in warfare” occurring—were not just unsupported by the facts but refuted.


Charles E. Myers, “Air Support for Army Maneuver Forces,” Armed Forces Journal, March 1987. “Chuck” Myers conducted seminars on what he and other military reformers consider to be the core mission of air forces in warfare to most directly impact the outcome of the war: “close air support,” or direct support to ground forces in contact with the enemy, the classic mission of the German “Stuka” in World War II and of the U.S. Air Force A-10 in the wars in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan.

brilliant and innovative aircraft designer. This article argues “Seventy-five years of praying at the altar of Giulio Douhet—the god of strategic bombing—has proved worthless. We must assess bombing theory and practice analytically, and develop a new model for the future.”


James Stevenson, The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1993); James Stevenson, The $5 Billion Misunderstanding: The Collapse of the Navy’s A-12 Stealth Bomber Program (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2001). Stevenson’s two comprehensive treatises address much more than just the history of the aircraft in the titles. He also addresses the concepts behind successful fighter designs and how the aviation bureaucracy in the Pentagon is willing to embrace, instead, poorly conceived fighter and bomber aircraft and then spend untold billions of dollars to bring those bureaucratically and politically driven aircraft concepts to fruition.

Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present (The Free Press, 1989). “Van Creveld considers man's use of technology over the past 4,000 years and its impact on military organization, weaponry, logistics, intelligence, communications, transportation, and command...”

George C. Wilson, Supercarrier: An Inside Account of Life Aboard the World’s Most Powerful Ship, the USS John F. Kennedy (Berkeley Publishing Group, 1992). A veteran defense journalist of 50 years, Wilson takes the reader inside the armed forces for an unvarnished look at military affairs from the literal ground level up.
William L. Smallwood, *Warthog: Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War* (Brassey’s, 1993). “Smallwood, who interviewed 143 of the pilots who flew the A-10 in the Gulf War, here presents an exhilarating, fact-packed narrative that conveys the emotional as well as the technical/tactical aspects of the Warthog effort during Desert Storm.” The A-10 proved extremely effective in both Gulf wars and Afghanistan, while at the same time was among the most survivable per combat sortie.

**Congress**

Robert G. Kaiser, *So Damn Much Money: The Triumph of Lobbying and the Corrosion of American Government* (Vintage, 2010). “The life story of Washington lobbyist Gerald Cassidy is used to illuminate how Washington has changed over the past three decades in this bleak but informative book…The author also lays out a larger history of influence peddling in federal politics, stretching back to the Civil War era, and examines the evolution of today's permanent campaigns…”


**Web Sites**

*YouTube Videos of John Boyd.* At [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U_fjaqAiOmc&feature=related](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U_fjaqAiOmc&feature=related), find a series of videos of John Boyd’s presentations to audiences at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base in the 1990s. Other video materials, of varying quality, about Boyd and his work are also there. Search the column on the right at the Web site.

*Don Vandergriff’s Web site.* Vandergriff’s Web site at [http://www.donvandergriff.com/index.html](http://www.donvandergriff.com/index.html), self described as “Whether it’s in business, health care, law enforcement or national security, the 21st century is filled with volatility and uncertainty. How do we develop leaders who are adaptable, agile and able to help our organizations evolve in the face of an unpredictable environment?”

*Defense and the National Interest* contains the works of many military reformers, including those of John Boyd, Franklin C. Spinney, Chet Richards, William S. Lind and others. Find these extensive materials at
http://dnipogo.org/, along with the text and associated materials of this handbook.


Project on Government Oversight, at http://www.pogo.org/, support multiple efforts associated with military reform and good government and describes itself as “an independent nonprofit that investigates and exposes corruption and other misconduct in order to achieve a more effective, accountable, open, and ethical federal government.”
The Pentagon Labyrinth aims to help both newcomers and seasoned observers learn how to grapple with the problems of national defense. Intended for readers who are frustrated with the superficial nature of the debate on national security, this handbook takes advantage of the insights of ten unique professionals, each with decades of experience in the armed services, the Pentagon bureaucracy, Congress, the intelligence community, military history, journalism and other disciplines. The short but provocative essays will help you to:

- identify the decay—moral, mental and physical—in America’s defenses,
- understand the various “tribes” that run bureaucratic life in the Pentagon,
- appreciate what too many defense journalists are not doing, but should,
- conduct first rate national security oversight instead of second rate theater,
- separate careerists from ethical professionals in senior military and civilian ranks,
- learn to critique strategies, distinguishing the useful from the agenda-driven,
- recognize the pervasive influence of money in defense decision-making,
- unravel the budget games the Pentagon and Congress love to play,
- understand how to sort good weapons from bad—and avoid high cost failures, and
- reform the failed defense procurement system without changing a single law.

The handbook ends with lists of contacts, readings and Web sites carefully selected to facilitate further understanding of the above, and more.