

# AMERICA'S DEFENSE MELTDOWN



Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress



13 non-partisan Pentagon insiders, retired military officers  
& defense specialists speak out

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## CHAPTER 2

# SHATTERING ILLUSIONS

## A National Security Strategy for 2009-2017

Col. Chet Richards (U.S. Air Force, ret.)

War no longer exists. Confrontation, conflict, and combat undoubtedly exist all round the world ... and states still have armed forces which they use as a symbol of power. None the less, war as cognitively known to most non-combatants, war as battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists.<sup>1</sup>

The new administration will take office in January 2009, inheriting a budget for the Department of Defense that will exceed \$600 billion dollars per year, roughly equal to the rest of the world put together.<sup>2</sup> Because we are not facing the possibility of armed conflict with the rest of the world put together, it is clear that some adjustment is appropriate.

In theory, such adjustment is straightforward. The administration considers trends in the world situation and devises a national security strategy to deal with those trends. It then examines the capabilities of our current military forces, identifies areas where our forces are either deficient or superfluous and proposes a plan to rationalize them. As part of the planning process, the administration considers various combinations of forces, facilities and new programs until it settles on one that provides the requisite level of capability at a risk and for a cost that the president considers acceptable. The risks and costs may be domestic – political – as well as strategic.

### **What is a “National Security Strategy” and Do We Need One?**

Some would argue that producing a “national security strategy” is a wasteful exercise because the process must take too many unknowns into account. The result, in this view, is little more than a public relations gambit to sell decisions that were made through domestic political trade-offs or by inertia. Others might take the position that although a strategy could be useful, divulging it would be dangerous because its dissemination would alert our enemies.

Before proposing a strategy, therefore, it is useful to consider what it is that we want such a strategy to do. The most basic question is why we need a formal strategy at all. Why not, in other words, just “wing it”? This means that at any given time, for any particular problem, the administration takes the action that appears most likely to accomplish its objectives. Why wouldn't this work?

### Ad hoc strategies

As we know from our everyday lives, “winging it” often produces acceptable results, despite aphorisms like “if you don’t know where you’re going, any road will take you there.” At less than the top levels of tennis, for example, a good strategy is to keep the ball in play and let the opponent make the first mistake – hit the ball into the net or set up an easy winner. Some of the greatest strategists have recommended similar approaches to warfare. Sun Tzu told commanders, for example, to prepare their troops and then let them exploit the current situation.<sup>3</sup> Instead of detailed battle planning, Rommel relied on the training of his troops and his own mental agility to find a means to victory in the unpredictable action of combat.<sup>4</sup>

A closer examination of these examples, however, reveals that in both Sun Tzu and Rommel were addressing the tactical level of warfare, fighting and winning battles. National leaders, on the other hand, must be concerned with more than tactics.<sup>5</sup> Otherwise, the country will have a *de facto* strategy of concentrating our energies at the tactical level with the hope that victory on enough battlefields will force an acceptable solution on the opposing government or whomever we are fighting. Unfortunately, there are too many examples, from Pyrrhus in ancient Greece to Cornwallis during the American Revolution to the German Army on the Eastern Front, to the United States in Vietnam and Iraq, where tactical victories did not produce the desired strategic results.

There is a missing element in all of these, a layer of strategy that would link the efforts expended on the ground to the results that national leaders want to achieve. This layer is usually known as *grand strategy*. Ideally, a grand strategy would integrate all elements of national power to secure our vital interests against today’s and tomorrow’s opponents. It would of necessity operate for decades, carefully matching means to ends and assuring that national strength is conserved for future generations.<sup>6</sup>

Although the need for a national or grand strategy stated in this manner may appear obvious, there are practical problems applying it to a republic like ours. Perhaps the most limiting is that we have a political revolution every four years and therefore external priorities are a reflection of the domestic political realities of the moment, or, at its most farseeing, the next election. One does not have to be a strategic Luddite to question the role of more formal strategies in our national life.

Domestic political considerations aside, it is debatable whether human beings have the wisdom to construct such far-reaching structures. As the influential blogger “Fabius Maximus” observed:

Even if the people of a developed State could agree on a goal, an ambitious grand strategy remains a chimera for a global power.

It is hubris to believe that any person or small group has sufficient information to develop a plan on a global scale. There are too many complex, unknowable

factors. Social factors, such as ethnic and religious dynamics. Plus economic, military, and political factors. We lack the understanding to process the data into accurate patterns – a plan. That requires a science of sociology developed to the degree of modern chemistry, so that we could reliably predict results of our actions. Unfortunately sociology is at the stage of chemistry in the Middle Ages, when it was called alchemy. In fact, the yearning for a grand strategy is the equivalent to the search for the Philosopher's Stone.<sup>7</sup>

Such warnings should be heeded, but they are too pessimistic when taken as absolute prohibitions against high-level strategy. The British, for example, were successful for nearly two centuries with a grand strategy that included maintaining naval superiority over any competing power in Europe and using all elements of power to ensure that no single state came to dominate the continent. One can contrast their success, however, with British efforts since 1914 and German and Japanese grand strategies in the first half of the 20th century. Grand strategies, in other words, are useful and arguably necessary, but they are not sufficient for national prosperity. So we need to be careful what we ask of national or grand strategy – and this chapter will horrify purists by using the terms interchangeably – recognizing its value but remaining realistic and somewhat humble about our ability to create and implement one.

### Preparation

If we adopt a national posture of opportunism-of-the-moment, despairing of better, then we forgo what even an imperfect strategy could provide. When choices must be made – when resources are not sufficient to accomplish every objective – there must be a basis for picking some courses and rejecting others. In a democracy, furthermore, some critical mass of the population must agree with, or at least acquiesce in, why the administration is spending their money and lives. Otherwise the national leaders formulating the strategy risk unemployment at the next election.

It is important to reach a widely-shared view that the stated basis is appropriate because conditions of military superiority do not emerge suddenly or swiftly and they are never permanent. Without a strategic roadmap to guide decision making, national power – economic, cultural, military and eventually political – slips away. Weapons systems – whose development spans several administrations – are not developed or are late and unsuited for the task,<sup>8</sup> personnel systems train people to fight the last war, tactics and doctrine focus on enemies, like the Soviet Union, who no longer pose a threat, and military operations do not produce the results that the country was promised.

Over the last two administrations, we have experienced the effects of poorly conceived strategy at the national level. The result has been an accelerating erosion of our strength as a nation, with stagnant incomes, declining health standards, soaring

prices for the most basic ingredient of our well-being – energy – and the evisceration of our military, burdened by a worn-out and anachronistic inventory of weapons and a cadre of soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen overstressed by repeated deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.

On the balance, therefore, the United States will benefit from a national security strategy that avoids the trap of predicting or programming the future, yet enunciates a clear strategic purpose for the use of military and other elements of national power (including when not to use them). Such a grand strategy will determine the place of the United States within the international system – reassuring allies, attracting the uncommitted, and giving pause to potential opponents, which is a fair trade-off for alerting them – and it will also help solve some of the problems inherent to all democracies, that of letting internal politics drive the nation’s involvement with the military forces of other countries.

### **A National Security Strategy for the United States**

Perhaps our diplomacy of the first five decades of this century, and our reactions to the very different problems that have assailed us since 1950, both reflect realities much deeper than our responses of either period: namely, the lack of any accepted, enduring doctrine for relating military strength to political policy, and a persistent tendency to fashion our policy towards others with a view to feeding a pleasant image of ourselves rather than to achieving real, and desperately needed, results in our relations with others.<sup>9</sup>

This chapter represents an executive summary of a national security strategy as might be presented by the new administration to the 111th Congress. It is intended to provide all the security that military force can, while reducing the burden on the American taxpayer and thereby freeing resources for citizens to spend or invest as they see fit.

The elements of this strategy, or any national security strategy, are:

- The endstate – what the United States should look like and wants to achieve inside the international system. Devising a new analytical framework that helps policy-makers and senior military leaders to define and routinely reevaluate the purpose, method and endstate for the use of American power must be a top priority if America is to avoid unnecessary conflicts and stop squandering its wealth and power.

Defining the endstate is the job of the highest political leadership of the country speaking on behalf of the American people who elected them. It is an entirely political task that must precede and therefore lies beyond the scope of national security strategy. The new National Defense Strategy adopts this approach, repeating the political objectives of promoting freedom, justice

and the spread of democracy within a stable system of states that can control insurgencies and transnational violent groups within their borders.<sup>10</sup> The next administration must consider whether such an open-ended, if laudable, goal represents a viable endstate.

- The dynamics of the world situation, including the major security challenges to the United States and the directions they appear to be taking. Nobody has an infallible crystal ball, so precise forecasts are specious. The general outlines, however, of any major military threats would be visible today.
- The administration's philosophy on the relative importance of these threats to the United States and the tools we have for dealing with them, which may range from confronting them to containing them to ignoring them. It is in this section that the administration should address the utility of military force.
- The direction the administration intends to take, given the situation, the status of U.S. forces, and its philosophy on the usefulness of the means available. The direction must balance between being too general, so that it offers no guidance, and too specific, so that it becomes irrelevant before it can be promulgated.
- The first steps it intends to take. So if an element of the administration's approach is to reduce spending on Cold War-era weapons programs, there should be a statement, "As our initial step, we will cancel the ..." A statement like this, which will be elaborated in the details of the strategy, signals to the American people that this is a strategy the new administration intends to implement.

Although the theory is straightforward, the formulation of strategy can be tortuous because people will disagree on the elements and defend their positions for personal, philosophical, political or bureaucratic reasons to the point of obstruction. A trillion dollar annual expenditure,<sup>11</sup> whether justifiable analytically or not, brings along a potent constituency, people whose prosperity, livelihood, or in the case of wounded veterans, for example, even survival depend on this flow of money.

Because a strategy that does not lead to feasible plans is both worthless and wasteful, the administration should make an estimate of what is possible. If Congress, for example, is not going to allow cancellation of major programs or the demobilization of substantial parts of the force structure, then the administration should not build these elements into its proposals. Even without this level of change, the administration can rationalize defense by eliminating overhead, support and bureaucracy duplicated among the services – the "four air forces" situation providing just one example, the fact that it has persisted for so many years testifying to its intractability. A coherent

national security strategy can provide the basis for making these decisions and for selling them to the American public, bypassing the entrenched special interests who are now keeping them alive.

If the administration defines a logical strategy – including an attractive endstate – and sells it consistently, then what is impossible today may become possible or even inevitable in three or four years as the country’s economic position changes (either for better or for worse).

### The World Today

The new administration should begin by describing the trends in military threats to the United States. Although the process for deriving the points will be complex and even convoluted, if the administration expects the American people to buy into the results, they must be presented in terms that make sense to the average citizen.

Here is one view of the world; the administration’s may differ but should be explainable in about the same space:

- The number of countries that possess nuclear weapons – now assumed to be nine<sup>12</sup> – will not decrease and may increase. The Center for Defense Information lists 35 countries that have some sort of civilian atomic energy program,<sup>13</sup> and several states in the Middle East are improving their knowledge of nuclear technology under the guise of developing stable sources of power for their populations.<sup>14</sup> Even those that are under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency may attempt to hide their weapons programs or they may renounce the treaty and expel the inspectors. No country with nuclear weapons has ever been invaded, much less occupied, a lesson not lost on any number of national leaders.
- Several states are improving their conventional (non-nuclear) military capabilities, including Russia, China and India. These efforts will bolster their regional capabilities but do not present any direct threat to the United States or its allies.

Figure 1

Country	Potential Internal Conflicts	Miles of Border
Russia <sup>15</sup>	Chechnya; far eastern border areas	12,487
China	Tibet, Taiwan, Uyghurs (potential Muslim separatists)	13,743
India	Naxalite and other Maoist guerrillas; separatist movements in Assam, Kashmir, and Nagaland; sectarian violence	8,763



As shown in Figure 1, all three of these countries have, for example, long borders with potentially hostile states and all face significant threat of internal conflict:

By comparison, the United States faces no military threat in the foreseeable future from along its 7,478 miles of border with Canada and Mexico and no internal conflicts where military force must be employed. Comparisons of military spending between the United States and other countries with significant military capabilities must therefore be made with caution.

- All major conventional powers also possess nuclear weapons or are allies of the United States or both, and this situation will continue.
- The United States could become involved in a conflict if an ally were attacked by another country. It is not clear whether this possibility is becoming more likely, and the national security apparatus of the new administration should spend some time examining this question.
- There are any number of states that do not have functioning governments regarded as legitimate by their citizens. Although the potential for armed conflict within and between these countries will remain high, none of them poses a threat to the security of the United States.
- There are transnational, nonstate organizations that can do damage. Because these organizations do not possess military forces of their own, they are most appropriately regarded as criminal cartels. As is the case with fighting international piracy on the high seas, the military can provide assistance. The ultimate solution, however, as with all criminal enterprises, lies in the emergence of local governments that create environments hostile to criminal organizations.

As noted, the new administration's list may differ, but its analysis should encompass these same categories: nuclear war, major conventional war, "brushfire" war, stability operations, and non-state armed conflict or what is also called "Fourth Generation" warfare.<sup>16</sup>

### **Tools of Policy**

Although some commentators, particularly on the left, decry the creation of an American empire and a perceived drive for global hegemony, the fact is that the United States has a surprisingly limited capability to influence events around the world. We are straining, for example, to keep fewer than 200,000 troops in Iraq and Afghanistan,<sup>17</sup> of which perhaps 40-50 percent are patrolling or otherwise in combat roles (the rest

perform support functions). Should a significant fraction of the 55 million people living in these two countries decide to do so, they could certainly drive us out. Such a possibility remains.

Another factor that constrains our options is financial. The purchase of American debt by countries such as China and Russia is well documented and in such quantities that it would be difficult to continue operations in Iraq and Afghanistan without it.<sup>18</sup> Yet, unlike most previous empires, the United States is not likely to emerge from Iraq and Afghanistan with any improvement in its national wealth. That is, the results of our occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan are not likely to generate wealth sufficient to pay back those who have loaned us the money to conduct them and also to increase the prosperity of the people of the United States in general, although the fortunes of certain sectors, such as defense contractors, may improve immensely. We are, it seems, the first imperial power to be paying for the privilege, with estimates of the total cost of the war running in the \$3 trillion to \$5 trillion range.<sup>19</sup>

Given constraints such as these, the new administration should describe the utility of military force to deal with the trends it identified.

### Employing the military tool

How should we procure and operate military forces in the 21st century to accomplish the national goals as set out in the Constitution and elaborated by the new administration? Following Sun Tzu's famous admonition that to win without fighting is best, a superior national security strategy would minimize the number of people who want to confront us violently and deny even these adversaries the ability to accomplish much in the way of disruption.

It is impossible, of course, to eliminate all threats to our well being, and attempting to carry our quest for security to unreasonable levels does our opponents' jobs for them:

The culture of fear is like a genie that has been let out of its bottle. It acquires a life of its own – and can become demoralizing. ... We are now divided, uncertain and potentially very susceptible to panic in the event of another terrorist act in the United States itself.<sup>20</sup>

Most of the means for reducing the threat of violence do not involve military forces and rely instead on trade, diplomacy, commerce, intelligence, law enforcement, tourism, educational exchange and so on.<sup>21</sup> In a world populated by human beings, however, there will be times when amicable agreement is not possible, when religious fervor or nationalistic feelings or pride or ego combined with miscalculation of the odds of success leads to the use of armed force.

So there is need for military force, even if the administration were to adopt an

isolationist national posture. To answer the question of how much, the administration will need to consider a set of issues that relate military force to national objectives. Specifically:

1. What role should military forces play in the national security of the United States?
2. When is it appropriate to use military forces for missions other than defending the United States from attack? In particular, when is it appropriate to use such forces outside the borders of the country?
3. Given our answers to questions 1 and 2, how many tanks, fighter aircraft, aircraft carriers and other forces for large-scale, non-nuclear combat do we need?

The next three sections will illustrate how the new administration could address these questions.

### **As Far as the United States is Concerned, What is the Role of Military Force in the 21st Century?**

To help citizens and members of Congress grasp why the nature of national defense is changing, and so why its organization and funding must also change, the national security strategy should supply the historical context. The rest of this section provides an outline.

After winning its independence, the new country faced many potential armed threats, from rebellion to depredations by Indians along the frontier, but the founders felt that most of them could be dealt with by the state militias.<sup>22</sup> In fact, there was a heated debate over whether to have an army, which explains the curious language in Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution authorizing Congress to raise and fund an army, language not applied to the Navy.

Although few argued that military force was anything but necessary – there were major wars in Europe, for example, every generation or so – for more than 150 years the standing U.S. Army was quite small. It would be augmented with volunteers when necessary, but then shrink back to its normal size.<sup>23</sup> So George Armstrong Custer, who had been a dashing major general of cavalry in the Civil War, died 11 years later wearing a lieutenant colonel's silver leaves.

This arrangement worked so long as the country observed George Washington's warning to avoid foreign entanglements.<sup>24</sup> For 130 years, this was not difficult: The new nation was absorbed with spreading across the continent, subduing its original inhabitants and incorporating millions of new ones, a destiny that was manifest to

all but the original inhabitants. Until 1917, we saw little need to engage the nations of Old Europe on their home territory.

Time and technology march on, however, and by the early 20th century, our ocean moats had shrunk to a week's steaming and it was clear that in a few years, the Atlantic and Pacific would join the English Channel in the list of barriers that could be crossed in hours or even minutes.

After World War II, the argument was made that because our oceans no longer shielded us, we needed a capable defense structure available on very short notice. For this reason, post-war administrations decided to maintain a standing military comparable in size to the largest anywhere, ready to defend the country from threats from any direction, and to form alliances whose members we would assist in defending themselves from threats from any direction.

### **Types of Military Threats**

These threats consisted of three broad types, and this classification is important for explaining the proposed changes in defense policy. First, there were the conventional forces – the tanks, airplanes, soldiers, ships, and so on like we faced in World War II. They could wreak enormous damage and kill huge numbers of people – fatalities in the 50 to 70 million range are often cited for World War II – but they took some time to do it. Because they needed large numbers of trained troops and vast supplies of expensive weapons, they made up (and still make up) the majority of the world's defense budget.

Then there were the nuclear forces. They were relatively cheap, in comparison to conventional forces.<sup>25</sup> Like conventional weapons, nukes could cause considerable damage, but they could do it in seconds. By the mid-1960s, there were enough of these in the arsenals of the major nuclear powers that the survival of the human race itself was doubtful, should they ever be used.<sup>26</sup>

After a brief skirmish over which service would monopolize the nuclear advantage, nuclear power reinforced the traditional individual-services way of war that dominated the Cold War. The Goldwater-Nichols Act had created the combatant commands, such as Central Command and Pacific Command, and had given them operational control of the forces in their areas of responsibility, but the money – and along with it the power to determine how the forces would train, equip and fight – remained with the service bureaucracies that, for the most part, were not motivated by the needs or desires of the combatant commanders.

Finally, there was “none of the above,” the “unconventional” threats, primarily insurgencies, that manifested themselves in “low intensity conflicts.” The militaries of the developed world tended to ignore them at least as far as spending money on “special forces” to engage in them, on the grounds that “if we can lick the cat, we can lick the kitten.”<sup>27</sup> As one Army officer recently put it, the U.S. military considered

insurgencies “ephemeral anomalies.”<sup>28</sup> Because we did not put any great emphasis on the subject, and although special forces are highly trained, there are very few of them (hence “special”), and because they needed little in the way of expensive hardware, they were cheap.

Thus the Cold War. Then over the space of a few months, the Soviet Union fell and the Cold War ended.<sup>29</sup>

In the shadow of Soviet conventional and nuclear attack, Cold War defense budgets had seldom been challenged. Thanks to a compliant and supportive Congress, the admirals and generals would design their acquisition programs to counter a set of predictable but potentially devastating threats, threats that no one in Congress was willing to challenge. The end of the Cold War constituted a tectonic shift in international relations that required innovation, creativity and a real understanding inside the Armed Forces.

Unfortunately, it has hardly made an impact. The experience of direct assault on the American homeland on Sept. 11, 2001 had surprisingly little influence on the structure, thinking and modernization of America’s air, ground and naval forces. To cite a recent example, combatant commanders’ urgent requests for armed vessels capable of operating in the riverine or coastal environments have met with lukewarm responses.

### **When is the Use of Military Force Appropriate?**

In the Pentagon, downsizing did not raise the questions that should shape the armed forces’ destiny – questions such as, whom and where do we fight? How should we fight? And, most important, what is the strategic purpose – the desired endstate – for which we will be required to fight? All of these questions help answer the larger question of when the nation should bear the costs of using its military forces.

Because we face no conventional military threat to our survival in the early post-Cold War period, any use of non-nuclear military forces by the United States will be voluntary, in “wars of choice” or “cabinet wars” as they are sometimes called. They would represent the “continuation of policy” by other means, in the words of the U.S. military’s favorite strategist, the early 19th century Prussian aristocrat Carl von Clausewitz.<sup>30</sup>

The new administration must decide whether such wars are appropriate for the United States. When, in other words, should U.S. military forces be used for missions other than the immediate defense of the United States, which requires only nuclear deterrence and a very few conventional ground, sea and air forces? How the new administration answers this question will determine the size and composition of U.S. military forces.

### **Can we run on autopilot?**

Before examining potential uses for military force in the 21st century, it should be acknowledged that some people would pick an arbitrary percentage of the U.S. gross

domestic product, usually 4 or 5 percent, and spend that amount on something every year. The logic often provided is that we have spent that percentage at times in the past.<sup>31</sup> This rationale, however, neglects the world situations at those times, including the existence of major threats in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

The constant percentage argument also overlooks the enormous growth in the U.S. economy since the 1970s, which would increase spending on a constant percentage basis even if all other nations eliminated their weapons, and it does not account for other priorities in the early 21st century, including the fall of the dollar, rise in energy prices, and impending retirement of the baby boom generation.

Examined in this light, the arguments for holding defense spending at a constant percentage of GDP appear designed more to ensure a money flow to the defense industries than to improve the security and well-being of the rest of our citizens. It is important, therefore, that the new administration conduct a legitimate examination of our defense needs and make recommendations accordingly.

#### Potential uses for military force

Although the Soviet Union is gone, there remain potential uses of conventional military forces in the 21st century. These include, in rough order of potential severity (as contrasted with likelihood):

1. A major conventional conflict between the United States and a “near-peer” power, usually hypothesized as either China or Russia, but which could represent the emergence of another as yet unspecified conventional threat.
2. Wars between allies of the United States and other states. These might include proxy wars between our ally and that of another major power. The word “ally” is used in the loose sense of any state that the United States would feel compelled to assist, regardless of formal treaty obligation. Thus, Kuwait was such an ally in 1990, and Saudi Arabia is today.
3. Invasion and occupation of a developing country by U.S. military forces. This option also includes assistance to an insurgency, which, like an invasion, involves the use of U.S. military power against the government of a foreign country. Oddly, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) fails to consider aid to insurgencies.<sup>32</sup>
4. Counterinsurgency (COIN), where the military forces of the United States assist a friendly government in suppressing an attempt by indigenous rebels to overthrow it or to replace it within a region of that country. This is the only

type of irregular operation considered by the NDS, placing that document in the mainstream of nearly a century of policies backing rulers clever enough to convince us that they were supporting American interests at the time.<sup>33</sup>

5. Law enforcement, where U.S. military forces suppress nonstate groups other than insurgents. Piracy is an immediate example: some 95 percent of U.S. exports/imports continue to move by sea. Today, any interruption in the flow of goods and commodities into and out of American ports would have serious consequences for American economic stability and prosperity.<sup>34</sup>
6. Stability operations and peacekeeping, where military forces are used primarily for nonconflict roles.

The new administration should carefully examine these potential missions, looking at the circumstances under which they might occur, the costs and risks if they did, and the options for mitigating them, including non-military means. This analysis must be “zero-based,” that is, conclusions must be justified on the basis of the unfolding world situation and not merely as a continuation of U.S. policy. Regaining the strategic immunity once provided by the oceans and our fleets may be impossible, but it is not impossible to restore most of it through the prudent use of rational diplomacy and limited military power.

The next several sections will outline some of the issues involved in structuring forces to deal with each of these categories of conflict.

### War against a “near-peer”

During the 1990s, a few strategists came to an epiphany, recognition of which unites these writers like no other issue.<sup>35</sup> That insight is that major nations are not going to wage war on each other, except by means of analogies as in “trade war,” and so military force is of diminished utility in the modern world. With the nuclear weapons of the major powers checkmating each others’ conventional as well as nuclear forces, our oceans have become moats again. We have returned to where we were at the founding of the republic and where we stayed until after World War II. Can we rationalize or even downsize our conventional forces as we did for so many years before World War II?

As noted above, forces for a large-scale conventional war are expensive and will dominate the budget of any alternative where they are included. Under what circumstances would including large conventional forces in our planning make sense? Because it is difficult to imagine a conventional attack on the United States, the only way we could wage a real war against a substantial opponent would be if we brought our military to them. This means that we must hypothesize an opponent who:

1. Does not have nuclear weapons.
2. Or, if it does, has agreed that they will allow themselves to be defeated without using them. Otherwise our engagement would not be “war” in the usual sense, but some type of military sparring match, filler for the 24-hour news operations.
3. Is not a NATO ally or in some other alliance with the United States.
4. Has managed to acquire suitable weapons in large numbers, evolve effective doctrines, and recruit and train forces in their use.
5. Could, by means of conventional military actions alone, represent a threat to the quality of life of the people of the United States.

A look at the collection of states fails to reveal any immediate candidate. China and Russia have significant conventional capabilities, but as the opening of this chapter noted, they also face security challenges both along their long borders and internally. It should be noted that since the end of the Vietnam War, attempts of both of these to project military force beyond their own borders have been rare and not particularly successful except against very weak opponents.<sup>36</sup>

### **Alternatives**

The NDS observes that “the predominant near-term challenges will come from state and non-state actors using irregular and catastrophic capabilities.”<sup>37</sup> This raises the obvious question of why they should be the only ones. Rather than trundling our military forces around the world to replay the Battle of the Bulge, there are better alternatives for dealing with errant conventional forces, as the Vietnamese, Afghans and Iraqis have shown the world.

The next administration should study how we can make these proven irregular techniques work for us as 21st century alternatives to the slug-it-out-on-the-battlefield tactics of previous generations. We know that the Chinese are doing exactly that kind of planning should they ever have to confront U.S. forces in their vicinity.<sup>38</sup>

### *Implications for force structure*

In summary, the notion that the United States and her allies would engage another major power in large-scale conventional combat is more a fantasy than a scenario and should not affect the sizing of American military forces.

The next section will consider scenarios more likely to bring major conventional forces into conflict.



### Proxy wars and other wars supporting allies

The first Gulf war, the Korean War and the Vietnam War were of this type: The United States itself was not directly threatened, but believed that it must intervene on behalf of a third party that may itself be supported by another major conventional power. An example of a future war of this type might be a Serbian incursion into Kosovo backed by Russian tactical air in order to relieve beleaguered Serb communities. A proxy war ensues when the ground forces of European NATO states supported by American ships and warplanes intervene on behalf of the Kosovars.

The important point about all such wars to date is that the United States did not intervene alone but formed an alliance that helped counter the attack.<sup>39</sup> As is the case with confrontation with a near peer, the international community has options other than intervention with conventional forces, including diplomacy, economic sanctions and, as we did against the Soviets in Afghanistan, covert support to resistance forces.

### *Implications for force structure*

The imponderable in this scenario is unanticipated escalation that would present the best opportunity for major conventional powers to confront each other on a battlefield. Considering the potential for escalation into nuclear conflict, whether by miscalculation or emotion, the focus of U.S. policy regarding such confrontations should be on avoiding them, rather than viewing them as tools of policy. An appropriate strategy for the United States, therefore, is to maintain a level of conventional military force sufficient to act in concert with our allies to remove any temptation to settle international disputes through the use of military force.

The other chapters of this volume will make specific recommendations that can serve as starting points for the new administration as it undertakes this analysis.

### Invasion and occupation: Is occupation realistic?

In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the two outcomes that wars of choice have had in common is that they turned out to take much longer and they cost considerably more in lives and money than their proponents promised. The NATO-Serbian War (March 24-June 10, 1999) was supposed to last three days, but dragged on through 78 and ended only when the NATO alliance cobbled together the credible threat of a ground invasion and dropped demands that Serbia abdicate its sovereignty, and when the Russians withdrew their support for the Milosevic government. The miscalculations involving the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the American invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006 are too numerous and well known to merit further discussion here. The conclusion is that in an increasingly populated world, highly networked and awash in light weaponry, any group of people can, if it chooses, make occupation by any other group highly unpleasant.

Given the events of the last generation, the United States, her allies and other members of the developed world should be skeptical about the costs and potential benefits of such occupations. We must abandon the mindset of overt interventionism, at least without the support of our closest and most long-standing allies and give thought to when intervening is a reasonable option. The United States, in particular, should consider whether, if a substantial fraction of our NATO allies are not willing to join us, our proposed intervention is appropriate. Such an attitude might have served us well in the run up to the second Gulf War.

This seems like a strange requirement, because we are the only superpower standing and should be able to go anywhere in the developing world we want without any risk. This is true, we can. However, the problem we've never been able to solve is, "What then?" Unless we're invading Monaco, the Vatican, or some South Pacific island, our initial numerical advantage over any Third World military, particularly when one factors in air power, will turn into a huge numerical disadvantage relative to the population. In Iraq, the occupation involves 160,000 combat troops trying to control a country of some 20,000,000 (excluding the Kurds), few of whom share a common language, religion, or cultural heritage with us.

The problem is complicated by the fact that the fighting in Iraq is not so much an insurgency against an established government as a multifaceted civil war where various armed groups and militias jockey for power, vie for support from outsiders such as the United States, Saudi Arabia and Iran, and position themselves for the day that the occupation forces leave. This is a common situation when a state fails, and history shows that since the end of World War II, armed force by outsiders has been of limited effectiveness in resolving it.<sup>40</sup>

### Will COIN theory make occupations possible?

There are claims that counterinsurgency theory has proven itself in Iraq and so can solve the problem of other occupations. It may be early, however, to start claiming success for COIN doctrine in that country, which appears to be evolving into a religiously conservative state dominated by Shiite clerics and politicians friendly to Iran. These were not among the goals the president enunciated before launching the 2003 invasion.<sup>41</sup>

What is usually meant by "success" in Iraq is the recent decrease in U.S. casualties – also not one of the goals the president originally set out for the war. Even this decrease, however, has a variety of causes, the most significant of which is the decision by Moqtada al-Sadr to suspend operations by his al-Mahdi Army. Another factor in the decrease in casualties was the drawdown of ethnic cleansing operations in Baghdad as this once multiethnic city has become a maze of walled ghettos. In any case, the tempo of violence in Middle East civil wars ebbs and flows – one might recall Lebanon – and as this chapter is written, we are far too close to events to make any reasonable judgment on the eventual effect of U.S. actions.

Perhaps the strongest argument against future invasions, even if an insurgency against the occupation were somehow to be contained, is that nobody knows how to rebuild destroyed societies. Anyone who has driven across the northern end of the Gulf coast, from New Orleans to Mobile, can see this first hand. Even the area often cited as a success story, the former Yugoslavia, is an economic and social mess:

However badly run Kosovo may be at the moment, and however much gangsterism and ethno-nationalism have flourished there under the haphazard stewardship of the so-called international community. ... Bosnia is falling apart again; Macedonia still looks fragile.<sup>42</sup>

The upshot is that most interventions, and practically all occupations, will turn out badly in the 21st century, unless brutal force to the point of depopulation is used to coerce the inhabitants into submission.<sup>43</sup> If we wish to keep such interventions as policy options, we would need to greatly expand the U.S. military establishment and correspondingly increase spending in order to attempt to fight insurgencies around the world, with no expectation of success.

A corollary lesson is that whenever ideology defines the military objective, the result is usually a demand for military action that defies strategic logic. Justifying the ideology locks the orientations of senior leaders so that lack of success is interpreted not as evidence of poor strategy but as failure to try hard enough or long enough. Hitler's meddling with *Wehrmacht* operations on the Eastern Front after 1942 is often cited in this regard.<sup>44</sup> In the end, the operation fails because its aim is to fulfill an ideological purpose, not accomplish a strategic military requirement.<sup>45</sup>

This does not imply that the new administration should adopt an isolationist posture but that our interaction with the world must rest upon other than military means. U.S. and Western national security policy must resolve to live with developing countries without invading them, or if we do, to go in fully aware of and realistically assessing the likely costs and consequences. Military leaders charged with executing military action need to understand the strategic limits of what they can accomplish while reacting to pressure from politicians to execute open-ended, ill-advised and sometimes ideologically-driven missions. They should also be realistic in advising these same politicians about what military force can reasonably be expected to accomplish.

### *Implications for force structure*

If this strategy is adopted, the forces we maintain for use in conventional operations with our allies will suffice for the rare interventions we take as a group into developing countries. If we continue with an interventionist foreign policy that leads to the occupation of more countries, there is no way to estimate how many additional forces will be required.

### Counterinsurgency of the traditional type

There is considerable controversy on whether counterinsurgency by outside forces – a mission sometimes known as “foreign internal defense” – is possible. The record of such attempts is not good, El Salvador being the only recent success by U.S. forces.<sup>46</sup>

The focus of counterinsurgency is on establishing a legitimate government, and tanks and fighter aircraft have at most a limited role to play. As RAND researchers David Gompert and John Gordon IV concluded in a major new study of counterinsurgency prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense:

Like traditional insurgencies, this new type is essentially a contest for the allegiance of local populations. Consequentially, to counter it, foreign military forces are no substitute for effective and legitimate local governance, including critical public services and indigenous security forces. Indeed, data from some 90 insurgencies since World War II reveal that insurgencies nearly always fail against governments that are representative, competent, and honest in the eyes of their citizens.<sup>47</sup>

The issue in counterinsurgency is whether foreign military forces can contribute to the legitimacy of a threatened government. Gompert and Gordon note that the presence of foreign troops tends, instead, to diminish the legitimacy of a government:

Consequently, when an insurgency reaches the point that only foreign intervention can save the state, the insurgency tends to grow stronger and bolder, and the chances of defeating it decrease rather than increase. This is borne out by historical data, which reveal an inverse relationship between large-scale foreign intervention and successful COIN.<sup>48</sup>

### *Implications for force structure*

Regardless of the theoretical utility of military forces in counterinsurgency, or of its lack, they will not be a large contributor to the defense budget. A counterinsurgency mission may, however, affect the composition of U.S. forces. Several chapters in this anthology address forces for counterinsurgency.

### Law enforcement

*Armies will be replaced by police-like security forces on the one hand and bands of ruffians on the other, not that the difference is always clear, even today.*<sup>49</sup>

Our invasion of Afghanistan in our unsuccessful attempt to capture Osama bin Laden is one such example. The expedition against Pancho Villa in 1916-17, the confrontations with the Barbary pirates (1801-1815), and today’s anti-piracy operations at

sea are others. Much of what is hypothesized as “Fourth Generation Warfare” – state versus nonstate groups or “transnational insurgencies” – falls into this category and so does not represent a new form of warfare so much as an evolution of crime. Our opponents in these conflicts are not organized military forces or even insurgent units fighting to overthrow a government, but have more the form of transnational criminal cartels, albeit sometimes with an ideological or religious veneer. Al-Qaida fits this description as do many narco-trafficking cartels and even evolved street gangs such as MS-13. Our purpose in using military force would be not so much to wage war as to conduct extraterritorial law enforcement, and future administrations will have to be careful not to follow this path into another occupation of a foreign country.

Like most of our probable opponents, these criminal organizations have neither the means nor the desire to confront our tanks and combat aircraft in conventional battle. Instead, they will move aside and blend into the population. Once this happens, military forces become a minor facet of the law enforcement efforts because they will rarely be able to distinguish members of the criminal organization from ordinary civilians. As van Creveld noted, the populations of developed countries do not like to see their military forces inflicting severe damage on civilians.<sup>50</sup> Military forces can assist in support roles, such as by sealing off an area, enforcing martial law, providing logistics and operating high-tech equipment.

#### *Implications for force structure*

The conclusion as far as force structuring is concerned is that this mission will have little impact. Few people would argue for increasing the military budget so that we can enforce martial law in parts of Bolivia.

#### *Stability operations and peacekeeping*

Although the history of such operations does not give cause for optimism, the alternative – to do nothing – may not be acceptable to the populations of the developed world who sometimes demand that their military forces achieve high moral purposes, such as stopping genocide, that have nothing to do with defense of their own nations. As with all incursions into the Third World, however, the stopping part may be simple compared to what follows. What is required is establishing legitimate governments and functioning economies and their integration into the world’s economic and political systems. Unfortunately, as the quote above regarding the Balkans indicates, and our experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan and Haiti reinforce, these are the very things we don’t know how to do.<sup>51</sup>

#### *Implications for force structure*

To date, we have participated in these operations only as members of international organizations, such as NATO or the United Nations. Although peacekeeping (as con-

trusted with “peacemaking”) might be an important component of sizing forces for smaller members of these organizations, it typically only requires a small fraction of U.S. military capability, on the order of a brigade (5,000 troops).

There is also a large question about whether this is really a mission for military forces at all. Stability operations and peacekeeping do not require much of the traditional military skills of defeating capable opponents in combat. Instead, they require different competencies, more akin to law enforcement or engineering. History suggests that militaries that engage in these activities lose the ability to be effective combat forces.<sup>52</sup> Israel was given a rude reminder of this in the 2006 war with the nonstate group Hezbollah.

So while the goals of stability and peacekeeping are undoubtedly worthy, it is not at all clear that military forces as traditionally defined should be performing them. The missions that do apply – logistics, communications, intelligence, etc. – are support roles and will have little impact on force structure.

## Conclusions

The next administration will have the opportunity to find a new strategic formula for America’s national security. This new formula needs to be a better fit for the American people than our current mobilization-based military designed to re-fight World War II. The new formula should also reconsider our political ideology of exporting democracy through long-term military occupations and should not assume that we have found a formula for occupations.

It is debatable whether, given its costs and the uncertain nature of its outcomes, war should ever have been considered a tool of policy. In the early 21st century, the presence of nuclear weapons at the high end of the military operations spectrum combined with the demonstrated inability of Western military forces to achieve desired outcomes in Third World countries suggests that there is no longer room for debate. Framed this way, the question of national security policy for the 21st century becomes: In a world where virtually all of the threats to a nation’s well-being are self-inflicted – economic performance, distribution of wealth, pollution, infrastructure, immigration, education, health care, discrimination against ethnic minorities, etc. – where should military force fall in the priority list of things to spend money on?

For the new administration, the cardinal rule should be: *Military forces should be funded only for missions that only the military can do.* To use them for other purposes risks diluting their unique capabilities, and they probably won’t be very good at them.

The new administration should review the roles and sizes of our military forces under this conclusion. Here are several elements that might go into their recommendations:

1. Keep our nuclear deterrence credible against any conceivable combination of opponents. Deterrence depends not only upon the number of warheads but on

the survivability of the force and its ability to be effective. The administration should be wary of establishing a goal of total nuclear disarmament, however. Without nuclear weapons, large-scale conventional war between major powers becomes not only possible again but inevitable. The world would resume where it was in July 1945, before the Trinity test showed that nuclear weapons could be built.<sup>53</sup>

Although disarmament is neither practical nor desirable, considerable rationalization of and ultimately reduction in our nuclear force is possible; materials made available by the Center for Defense Information and its associated World Security Institute address alternatives.

2. Propose a plan for rationalizing conventional forces and then obtaining better value from the resources we devote to them. This plan should include:
  - a. The ultimate size and composition of a conventional force to cooperate with allies where the employment of such forces is required. There are several chapters in this book that describe such a force. This force would be adequate for all other uses of conventional military force by the United States.
  - b. A drawdown schedule for transitioning from our current force to the target force.
  - c. A program for mitigating the economic and social dislocations this will cause.

Chapters three through 11 address alternatives for realigning our conventional forces and their budgets to the realities of the 21st century.

3. Land and air forces that the administration wishes to retain but that are not trained or equipped for overseas employment with allies should be transferred to the National Guard and placed under the control of the states. The administration must carefully consider how to rationalize the Navy and Coast Guard to best perform the range of maritime missions, which covers the full spectrum from nuclear warfare to law enforcement to rescue at sea.
4. For law enforcement, insurgency and COIN: Retain some portion of our naval, Coast Guard and special operations forces to provide assistance for international law enforcement, counterproliferation, anti-piracy, hostage rescue and other activities in conjunction with our allies. Such forces may also participate in allied/international ventures to change regimes that have threatened their

neighbors or committed abuses of human rights so egregious that our politicians feel they cannot be ignored, although the natural tendency to resist occupations must be taken into account. Counterinsurgency is not a reason to fund conventional military forces because experience shows that governments that rely on foreign forces to protect them from indigenous guerrilla movements forfeit the very legitimacy they need to survive.

5. Think long and hard about the intelligence function. The first step toward the formulation of a new policy is to understand the realities of the Middle East as it is now.<sup>54</sup>

Providing the information that underpins that understanding is the job of intelligence, and it needs to take a much stronger role in national security policy than heretofore.

The last administration has experienced intelligence debacles on several levels, and failure to determine their causes and fix them will render the rest of our national security program meaningless. A brief survey illustrates this:

**Figure 2**

Event	Result
The Sept. 11 attack	Three thousand American deaths; incalculable cost to the nation in other ways
Failure to capture Osama bin Laden	Al-Qaida survives to plan further attacks, inspire a new generation of "ideological insurgent"
Failure to predict Iraqi reaction to prolonged occupation	Another 4,000 Americans killed, many thousands more severely injured, rejuvenation of al-Qaida, enhanced reputation of Iran, costs that will probably exceed \$3 trillion
Failure to understand Afghan reaction to prolonged occupation	Rejuvenation of the Taliban, explosion in opium cultivation, establishment of a Taliban / al-Qaida base area in northern Pakistan

Intelligence failures can occur at three stages of the understanding process, and the administration must conduct a zero-based review of each. First, we may not be collecting enough information or we may not be collecting the right information. Second, we may not be effectively converting information into intelligence, that is, interpreting the data we collect, sorting through its contradictions, filling in the missing areas and assessing what it means.<sup>55</sup> Finally, senior government officials including the president may not appreciate the intelligence product or, if it conflicts with strongly held beliefs, may choose to disregard it.



There are many oxen to be goaded in this review and it will take a strong and experienced individual to lead it. It should also be process-driven, not organizationally driven. The question, in other words, is not: How do we fix the CIA? It is how to provide intelligence that is more accurate and timelier than what we have today and how to make better use of it. This review should consider fundamental changes going beyond the updating of Executive Order 12333 that the administration issued in July.<sup>56</sup>

6. Exploit the creativity and innovation of the private sector. The next administration must avoid the temptation to let the well-publicized debacles involving contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan sour the country on harnessing the power of private enterprise. As they have in all modern wars, efforts by private industry will be important elements in any future conflict and will be crucial to our response to another attack on the scale of Sept. 11. No plan to increase the resiliency of our states and cities against attack can succeed without drawing on the private sector. Private enterprise brings decentralized decision making – the bureaucracies of even the largest companies pale in comparison to that of the federal government and those of most states – and an agility that comes from thousands of people and companies who use their creativity and initiative to solve their immediate problems.

Although most people would agree that the private sector is the engine of progress, the engine is not the vehicle. The issue is how better to employ the private sector to serve the national security of the United States.

Again, this analysis must be as free of assumptions as possible. The critical need is for the government to become better at regulating and managing contractors in the public interest. No function that contractors are now performing, or not performing, should be off the table. It should be always kept in mind that many of our future opponents are not the uniformed militaries of some state. As this chapter has tried to show, those are a fairly minor threat to U.S. national security. For the most part our future opponents are already privatized.

These points should not discourage the next president and his secretary of defense in the least. Arguments that fundamental change is too costly in political, military and monetary terms do not hold up to closer scrutiny. The reformed Prussian army that defeated Napoleon in 1814 and 1815 was certainly no more expensive than the unreformed one Napoleon humiliated in 1805. Programs designed to rationalize force design and doctrine save money. What is more important, they change the standards and expectations of military performance. This reorients thinking, behavior and action and is the path to success in conflict and prosperity in peace.

The remainder of this book provides recommendations for implementing a national security strategy consistent with what has been presented here. The purpose is to illustrate in hard numbers that the new administration has options that will provide for the national defense at an acceptable level of risk and at a cost that is affordable even in the constrained budgetary environment that the administration will face.

## ENDNOTES

- 1 Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force, The Art of War in the Modern World* (London: Penguin, 2005), 1.
- 2 Estimates of total U.S. spending on defense vary depending on what is included. Adding other items directly related to national security, such as Homeland Security, Veterans Affairs and interest on the debt to pay for defense-related items could bring the total to nearly one trillion dollars per year. For further information, see the *Military Almanac 2007* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information), 87, 110-111.
- 3 Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).
- 4 Douglas Fraser, *Knight's Cross* (New York: HarperCollins, 1994).
- 5 Sun Tzu addressed all levels of warfare, not just tactics, and he made clear distinctions of the levels of war that concern political and military leaders, respectively.
- 6 In this sense, the new National Defense Strategy (NDS) announced by the Department of Defense on July 31, 2008 rates as the military component of a grand strategy because it addresses the matching of elements of national power to achieve long-term political objectives. *National Defense Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, June 2008).
- 7 "Fabius Maximus," "The Myth of Grand Strategy," January 1, 2006, <http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2006/01/31/myth>
- 8 Lockheed, for example, won the right to build the F-22 fighter during the George H.W. Bush administration. The program actually started in former President Reagan's first term in office. Tom Christie addresses systemic problems with defense procurement in Chapter 10.
- 9 George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
- 10 *National Defense Strategy*, p. 1.
- 11 The total U.S. spending on all elements of national defense, including military forces, intelligence, homeland security, medical and other care for veterans, border security, and interest on past defense-related debt will total roughly a trillion dollars in 2008. See, for example, Robert Higgs, "The trillion-dollar defense budget is already here," The Independent Institute, March 15, 2007, <http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1941>; Robert Dreyfuss, "Financing the imperial armed forces: A trillion dollars and nowhere to go but up," *Tom Dispatch*, June 8, 2007, [http://tomdispatch.com/post/174793/robert\\_dreyfuss\\_the\\_pentagon\\_s\\_blank\\_check](http://tomdispatch.com/post/174793/robert_dreyfuss_the_pentagon_s_blank_check)
- 12 These are the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, *Military Almanac 2007*, p. 26) Israel, India and Pakistan have not signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, and North Korea has withdrawn from it.
- 13 Bruce Blair, "Primed and Ready," *The Defense Monitor*, XXXVI (3), May/June 2007, 1-5.
- 14 Marina Ottaway, Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy, Karim Sadjadpour, and Paul Salem, *The New Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), 19.
- 15 Russia also faces increasing internal security challenges as a result of its declining population. "Transcript of Remarks by Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Gen. Michael V. Hayden,

- at the Landon Lecture Series, Kansas State University,” Central Intelligence Agency, April 30, 2008.
- 16 For discussions of Fourth Generation Warfare, see Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith, 2004) and the various works of William S. Lind archived at <http://www.dn-i.net>; Martin van Creveld has stated that his notion of “non-trinitarian war,” as described in his *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991), is essentially the same as Fourth Generation War. Theorists like John Robb are examining conflict by groups so distributed, yet networked, that some have proposed a “fifth generation” of war. See Robb’s book, *Brave New War* (New York: Wiley, 2007).
  - 17 Andrew J. Bacevich, “Surging to Defeat: Petraeus’s strategy only postponed the inevitable,” *The American Conservative*, April 21, 2008; “No US troop increase in Afghanistan without deeper cuts in Iraq: Pentagon,” Agence France-Presse, May 7, 2008.
  - 18 The latest U.S. government figures are provided at <http://www.treas.gov/tic/mfh.txt>. They show that, as of February 2008, China holds approximately half a trillion dollars of U.S. government securities, and the “oil exporters” (i.e. the OPEC nations and others) account for another \$150 billion. Some experts consider these numbers to be understated because nations can buy these securities through private brokers, and many regard the size and composition of their reserves as state secrets.
  - 19 Linda J. Bilmes and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “The Iraq War Will Cost Us \$3 Trillion, And Much More,” *The Washington Post*, March 9, 2008. Three trillion dollars roughly equals a \$10,000 burden on every man, woman and child in the United States.
  - 20 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Terrorized by ‘war on terror’: How a three-word mantra has undermined America,” *The Washington Post*, March 25, 2007.
  - 21 The Department of Defense recognizes the “DIMES” model: diplomacy, information, military, economic, and societal-cultural factors. Walter Pincus, “Irregular Warfare, Both Future and Present,” *The Washington Post*, April 7, 2008.
  - 22 For a summary of these arguments, see Alexander Hamilton, “The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered,” *Federalist* No. 24.
  - 23 In the Civil War, more than 90 percent of the officers in the Union Army were U.S. Volunteers. Regular U.S. Army officers often got commissions in the U.S. Volunteers several grades higher than the ones they held in the U.S. Army. When the war ended and the Volunteers went home they would resume their U.S. Army commissions.
  - 24 From George Washington’s 1796 “Farewell Address” to the people of the United States: “So likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils.”
  - 25 Just to cite one example, according to the Center for Defense Information’s *Military Almanac 2007*, pp. 98-99, the cost of a Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile, capable of destroying any city on earth, is about half that of a single F-22 tactical fighter aircraft.
  - 26 This lesson took a while to sink in. Until about 1960, the United States considered “tactical” nuclear weapons as ordinary tools of war. See: Walter Pincus, “Eisenhower Advisers Discussed Using Nuclear Weapons in China,” *The Washington Post*, April 30, 2008.
  - 27 People will someday appreciate that facile phrases are a highly dangerous substitute for thought.
  - 28 Robert M. Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 3.
  - 29 Putting the end to another facile phrase, popular on the political right, that communism was a mortal threat because “no country had ever successfully thrown off communism.”
  - 30 Because the German word for “policy” can also be translated as “politics,” his formula also fits “wag the dog” wars waged for domestic political reasons.

- 31 For a typical list of justifications for spending 4 percent, see the Heritage Foundation's white paper, "Providing for the Common Defense: Why 4 Percent?" The Heritage Foundation, April 2, 2008, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/wp040208.cfm>
- 32 It could be argued, interestingly enough, that by funding and arming the Sunni "Awakening" movements in Iraq, we are siding with future insurgents against a Shi'ite government allied with Iran.
- 33 For many years, the policy was anti-communism and today it is anti-terrorism, both leading to our identification with unpopular rulers throughout the developing world.
- 34 With the predicted rise in Chinese and Indian energy consumption, it is likely that Asian states will be more dependent upon oil traveling by sea. Reasoning by analogy is often misleading, but access to the sea was a major cause for Japan's entry into World War II, a fact not lost on India or China, both of which maintain sizable fleets.
- 35 Two of the best known, William S. Lind and Thomas P. M. Barnett, agree on little else and have called each other "evil" in print.
- 36 China against Vietnam in 1979, and Russia (as the Soviet Union) against Afghanistan, quasi-internally against Chechnya (1994 to the present), and the recent conflict with Georgia.
- 37 *National Defense Strategy*, p. 22.
- 38 The best known example is *Unrestricted Warfare*, by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999), also known as the "Chinese colonel's paper." The fact that it was intended for the international readership should not detract from the validity of its message.
- 39 Even in Vietnam, we were supported by units from Korea, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines.
- 40 The many-sided nature of the fighting in Iraq and its implications are well-documented and analyzed in Bruce R. Pirnie and Edward O'Connell, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," *Rand Counterinsurgency Study 2* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008). The recent ineffectiveness of military force in solving what are largely political problems is documented in Patricia Sullivan, "War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 3: 496-524.
- 41 These included democracy and freedom for the Iraqi people, defeat of Islamic terrorists in that country, and of course, elimination of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction.
- 42 "The Case for Clarity," *Economist.com*, February 21, 2008.
- 43 For a discussion on the need for coercion in maintaining modern occupations, see Martin van Creveld, *The Changing Face of War*, (New York: Ballentine, 2006) and Sir Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force*.
- 44 Today, neoconservatives are making the same argument: "Recent suggestions in Washington that reductions could begin sooner or proceed more rapidly are premature." Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan and Jack Keane, "The New Reality in Iraq," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 16, 2008.
- 45 Geoffrey Regan, *Great Military Disasters. An Historical Survey of Military Incompetence*, (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1987), 14.
- 46 U.S. assistance in El Salvador (1981 to 1992) was limited to advice, training and financial assistance. For a detailed examination of U.S. actions in El Salvador, see: Steven Metz, *Counterinsurgency Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995). For an extensive discussion of counterinsurgency since the end of World War II, please refer to Chet Richards, *If We Can Keep It* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 2008), particularly Chapter 4.
- 47 RAND, "Countering Insurgency in the Muslim World, Rethinking U.S. Priorities and Capabilities," Research Brief, February 2008, describing the conclusions in David Gompert and John

- Gordon IV, *War by Other Means* (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2008). Insurgencies may also fail against brutal, incompetent dictatorships, of course.
- 48 Gompert and Gordon 2008, 34. See also Richards, *If We Can Keep It*, 50-52.
- 49 Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 225.
- 50 “To kill an opponent who is much weaker than yourself is unnecessary and therefore cruel; to let that opponent kill you is unnecessary and therefore foolish,” “Why Iraq Will end Like Vietnam Did,” [http://www.defense-and-society.org/creveld/why\\_iraq\\_will\\_end\\_as\\_vietnam\\_did.htm](http://www.defense-and-society.org/creveld/why_iraq_will_end_as_vietnam_did.htm)
- 51 To illustrate, one way to jump start an economy is for the developed world to begin buying things from it. Initially, these will often be agricultural commodities. Unfortunately, such a policy runs into opposition from domestic constituencies and leads to a variety of obstacles including agricultural tariffs and subsidies, “Buy American” provisions, and the desire of senior politicians to reward American contractors. For a discussion, see Thomas P. M. Barnett, *Blueprint for Action* (New York: Putnam, 2005), 244. Note that dividing a country along ethnic lines – sometimes offered as a solution for problems in developing countries – may exchange a single repressive and incompetent government for a set of them.
- 52 Martin van Creveld, *The Sword and the Olive*, (New York: Public Affairs/Perseus, 2002).
- 53 The new administration may come under some pressure to consider a goal of nuclear disarmament. Several figures of the foreign policy establishment from both parties, including Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, are advocating such an approach. See Carla Anne Robbins, “Thinking the Unthinkable: A World Without Nuclear Weapons,” *The New York Times*, June 30, 2008.
- 54 Ottaway 2008, 4.
- 55 Information reports, particularly raw reports of the type so often cited in the neoconservative press as evidence of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons or his close cooperation with Osama bin Laden, are notoriously unreliable. On any given day, for example, there are hundreds of reports of flying saucers, space aliens and Bigfoot. It is the job of intelligence to find the nuggets of legitimate information in the mound of reports that stream in.
- 56 “Executive Order: Further Amendments to Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities,” Office of the White House Press Secretary, July 31, 2008. The term “update” was used by the press secretary in the “fact sheet” issued with the executive order.