Report of Investigation

Entergy Nuclear Northeast

Indian Point #2

Security Services (IP2-431)

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January 25, 2002
Date
A. Executive Summary

In early November 2001, several concerns regarding security services at Indian Point #2 were brought to the attention of the Employee Concerns Program (ECP), Entergy Nuclear Northeast, Buchanan, NY. On November 13, 2001, the ECP Manager commissioned an independent investigation of the concerns by Mr. , a former investigator with the NRC, Office of Investigations, and a licensed attorney.

The investigation focused on whether the security officers at Indian Point #2 believed they could adequately defend the plant on the day of their interview and if they believed that a chilled environment existed among the security force. In addition, there are other issues such as: security officer requalification, the security of safeguards information, and the accuracy of Wackenhut’s Report (01-CED-011-02) on a chilling effect at Indian Point #2. A total of 59 security officers, including sergeants and lieutenants, were interviewed and, as a minimum, they were each asked a series of standard questions during the interviews.

The results of the investigation indicate that only 19% of those security officers stated that they could adequately defend the plant after the terrorist event of September 11th. The general feeling is that the standard “design basis threat” no longer applies and more security is needed. Each of the officers provided a list of improvements he/she thinks is necessary in order to “adequately” defend the plant. Some of their suggested improvements have already been made; other improvements are in the process of being made, and still other changes are under review by the Entergy Security Manager at Indian Point and consultants. The suggested improvements include new and updated security systems, weapons, defensive positions and equipment, additional training, and more security officers. Of particular concern to many of the officers is the belief that they should be carrying their weapons with a chambered round, as is the practice at Indian Point #3; they feel this would enable them to be better prepared to defend against an attack.

When asked, 59% of the security officers stated that they believe that a chilled environment exists among the security force. However, they stated that this does not apply to nuclear safety issues, which they believe would always be raised. Thirty-one percent of the officers stated that they have raised nuclear safety issues and 95% stated that they have raised concerns. Their belief is that the chilled environment exists as a result of issues related to Wackenhut site management, in areas such as administration, promotions, discipline, and general program management. Of those officers who raised issues with management, only 42% stated that those issues were adequately addressed. At the same time, 93% of the officers stated that they are willing to provide both positive and negative feedback to management. While 90% stated that they would raise issues during Guard Mount meetings, others have been
Several issues were raised regarding the requalification of the security officers. During the course of this investigation, there was also an ongoing Quality Assurance (Q/A) audit of the Wackershurt security officer training. There are five parts to an officers' annual requalification and each part is completed at different times of the year. It is the responsibility of the Training Coordinator to ensure that the security officers requalify within twelve months. Only 69% of the officers stated that they had completed what they believe to be the requalification process. The officers generally believed that the Simunition training was part of the Training and Qualification Plan (T&Q) required for requalification. While it was included in the Wackershurt training program, it was not part of the official T&Q standard. Seventy-nine percent of the officers stated that they had completed the Simunition training by the time of their interviews; this did not reflect a failure to complete training as alleged in the ECP. While 98% of the officers who carry the Glock believe that their training was adequate, most believe that they should qualify more than once each year. They would also like to see additional time at the range to improve their skills.

In response to a concern about the security of Safeguards Information, 5 (~8%) security officers identified a problem in this area. One problem dated back to 2000 and related to the security of training modules and exams, and the handling of those documents by one person. When the problem was reported to management in October 2000, it was not perceived as a Safeguards issue and no action was taken. There was a new Training Coordinator in the following year and none of the comments reflected any concerns with the security of the modules during 2001. Another officer indicated that he saw unprotected Safeguards material and then secured it.

Most of the security officers were critical of the results of the report conducted in March 2001 by Wackershurt (TWC) to “evaluate if a ‘chilling effect’ existed, or resulted from... the termination of a security officer” at Indian Point #2. Over an eight day period, two auditors interviewed 80 TWC personnel from each of the functional work groups. They concluded that “No chilling effect was indicated from the candid responses received during the interview process, nor a hesitation to report any concern or safety issue in the past, or future.” During this investigation, several officers recalled telling TWC auditors that they thought that a chilled environment did exist as a result of that termination. Most of the officers stated that they did not believe that their concerns were adequately addressed by the TWC report. The officers further indicated that their responses in March were similar to the responses that they provided during this investigation pertaining to the issue of a chilled environment.

However, the report did identify several problems which are relevant to concerns

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identified during this investigation. The Wackenhut report indicated that: “some of the TWC supervisory cadre are not trusted by the security force to properly and professionally address issues or concerns”; “perceived problem behaviors were the result of feedback/communication, lack of understanding, or lack of personnel management skills by supervision”; security officers are “more often ‘in the dark’ about emerging issues and changes that affect their performance on the job”; and “the lack of feedback caused a perception that ‘management did not care’.”

Entergy has retained consultants to review and improve security at Indian Point #2; preliminary changes to the defensive positions and strategy have already been made. Entergy has also organized a team to consolidate the security plans of the two units and ensure that the technical systems and strategies are compatible. The security officers favorably commented on the new support and respect they have received from the Vice President Operations. As noted above, a majority of the officers have articulated improvements which they feel are necessary to present a strong defense and repel any threat. They believe that Entergy management is concerned about security and noted that the time that was taken to listen to their concerns during this investigation is evidence of that. The officers appear optimistic that changes will occur and look to Entergy to effect some of those changes over the next several months.