Still at Risk
The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex

Comments of
Peter Stockton, Senior Investigator
Project On Government Oversight (POGO)
1100 G Street NW, #900
Washington, DC 20005
phone (202) 347-1122 fax (202) 347-1116
web www.pogo.org email pstockton@pogo.org
POGO - Who We Are

• The Project On Government Oversight (POGO) is an independent nonprofit that investigates and exposes corruption and other misconduct in order to achieve a more effective, accountable, open and honest federal government.

• POGO does not accept any funds from the federal government, corporations, unions, or anyone with a financial interest in the outcome of our investigations.
Nuclear Security Oversight
Background

• First report, *Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security at Risk*, released in 2001, since then, five other reports released, generating substantial news coverage and policy change.

• Information comes from concerned insiders (NNSA, DOE, DOD, military, NRC, and private contractors)

• Senior Investigator Peter Stockton served as personal troubleshooter to DOE Secretary Bill Richardson on physical and cyber security (1999-2001), also as senior investigator for 27 years on House and Senate committees.
Nuclear Security Concerns

• Major concern: Too many sites with weapon-grade weapon-quantity (CAT 1) nuclear material
  – Short timeline to create an improvised nuclear device (IND)
  – Sigma 20

• High consequence of stolen PU/HEU/warhead
Concerns cont.

• In 2001 report, we found that guard forces lost 50 percent of force-on-force (FoF) performance tests. The solution?...
  Deinventory problem sites
    – TA-18
      • Garden Cart
      • Kiva 3
    – LLNL
      • lacrosse stick
    – Y-12
      • wooden storage building
      • 5 targets with CAT 1
      • A number of security problems (friendly fire theft scenario, etc)
• HEUMF is not underground as recommended by Hagengruber
• Downblending, no plan for increased rate
Design Basis Threat

The Design Basis Threat (DBT) is a major driver of cost

- 2003 DBT (number of adversaries is less than $\frac{1}{2}$ of 9/11 force)
- 2004 DBT (number close to 9/11 force)
- 2005 (slightly more than $\frac{1}{2}$ 9/11 force)
  - Supposed to be implemented by 2008
  - Current waivers granted
    - Y-12 (when HEUMF loaded)
    - LLNL “non-enduring,” also couldn’t handle 2003 DBT
      - Gatling gun disaster
      - Failed 2/3 scenarios
Limitations of DBT

• POGO believes terrorist threat to a facility would be squad size or greater, based on DOE and military sources

• Our sources claim DOE’s new Graded Security Protection (GSP) is an effort to lower the DBT

• F-o-F performance test warnings, unable to test guard force for key advantages of terrorists (surprise, violence of action, & speed). Given these advantages, the guard force *should* win overwhelmingly

• It always comes down to timelines
POGO Concerns with Risk-Based Approach

• DOE sources have been through the formulation of risk-based approaches before, all efforts have come apart

• DBT is based on the Postulated Threat, which is developed by the intelligence community and is based on real experiences/data, unlike the simulations and probabilities used to develop a risk-based approach
Security Recommendations

• Sites should be tested by Grizzly Hitch, who are trained as terrorists as opposed to DOE’s current adversaries who are trained as defensive guard force

• Create aggressive schedule for downblending HEU

• POGO has sources who are interested in working on this with the National Academies
Security Recommendations cont.

- POGO could share a film – Weapons Under Fire, on lethality of weapons available to terrorists (e.g. platter charge, rpgs, 50 caliber API)

- DOE should federalize its guard force. Currently there is a controversy between DOE report and upcoming GAO report

- Whistleblower retaliation is still a problem and needs to stop for security issues to be addressed