

Still at Risk

The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex

Comments of
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POGO - Who We Are



- The Project On Government Oversight (POGO) is an independent nonprofit that investigates and exposes corruption and other misconduct in order to achieve a more effective, accountable, open and honest federal government.
- POGO does not accept any funds from the federal government, corporations, unions, or anyone with a financial interest in the outcome of our investigations.

Nuclear Security Oversight Background

- First report, *Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security at Risk*, released in 2001, since then, five other reports released, generating substantial news coverage and policy change.
- Information comes from concerned insiders (NNSA, DOE, DOD, military, NRC, and private contractors)
- Senior Investigator Peter Stockton served as personal troubleshooter to DOE Secretary Bill Richardson on physical and cyber security (1999-2001), also as senior investigator for 27 years on House and Senate committees.



Nuclear Security Concerns

- Major concern: Too many sites with weapon-grade weapon-quantity (CAT 1) nuclear material
 - Short timeline to create an improvised nuclear device (IND)
 - Sigma 20
- High consequence of stolen PU/HEU/warhead



Concerns cont.

- In 2001 report, we found that guard forces lost 50 percent of force-on-force (FoF) performance tests. The solution?...

Deinventory problem sites

- TA-18
 - Garden Cart
 - Kiva 3
- LLNL
 - lacrosse stick
- Y-12
 - wooden storage building
 - 5 targets with CAT 1
 - A number of security problems (friendly fire theft scenario, etc)
- HEUMF is not underground as recommended by Hagengruber
- Downblending, no plan for increased rate



Design Basis Threat

The Design Basis Threat (DBT) is a major driver of cost

- 2003 DBT (number of adversaries is less than $\frac{1}{2}$ of 9/11 force)
- 2004 DBT (number close to 9/11 force)
- 2005 (slightly more than $\frac{1}{2}$ 9/11 force)
 - Supposed to be implemented by 2008
 - Current waivers granted
 - Y-12 (when HEUMF loaded)
 - LLNL “non-enduring,” also couldn’t handle 2003 DBT
 - Gatling gun disaster
 - Failed 2/3 scenarios



Limitations of DBT

- POGO believes terrorist threat to a facility would be squad size or greater, based on DOE and military sources
- Our sources claim DOE's new Graded Security Protection (GSP) is an effort to lower the DBT
- F-o-F performance test warnings, unable to test guard force for key advantages of terrorists (surprise, violence of action, & speed). Given these advantages, the guard force *should* win overwhelmingly
- It always comes down to timelines

POGO Concerns with Risk-Based Approach

- DOE sources have been through the formulation of risk-based approaches before, all efforts have come apart
- DBT is based on the Postulated Threat, which is developed by the intelligence community and is based on real experiences/data, unlike the simulations and probabilities used to develop a risk-based approach

Security Recommendations



- Sites should be tested by Grizzly Hitch, who are trained as terrorists as opposed to DOE's current adversaries who are trained as defensive guard force
- Create aggressive schedule for downblending HEU
- POGO has sources who are interested in working on this with the National Academies

Security Recommendations cont.

- POGO could share a film – Weapons Under Fire, on lethality of weapons available to terrorists (e.g. platter charge, rpgs, 50 caliber API)
- DOE should federalize its guard force. Currently there is a controversy between DOE report and upcoming GAO report
- Whistleblower retaliation is still a problem and needs to stop for security issues to be addressed

