

THE PROPOSED SALE OF F-16's TO PAKISTAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND SCIENCE,
AND ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS**

OF THE

**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

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to do with the role of the United States government in the timing, the size, and the cost of the sale.

This proposal was developed and negotiated during a period of transition and extreme uncertainty in Pakistan -- after the death of President Liaqat Khan and before the full emergence of a stable, new government in Islamabad. Although I am certainly not arguing that Pakistan does not want these new aircraft, I do believe that this proposal was thrust upon the new government in a period of confusion and uncertainty and that such actions by our own government will not serve our long-term interest in promoting peace and stability.

CONCLUSION

In recent months, we have witnessed many hopeful developments in South Asia -- the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan; the tentative mitigation of the long-standing Indo-Pakistan rivalry; and most important, the emergence of democracy in Pakistan. These developments suggest that United States policy in the region should be moving in a new direction. In Pakistan, that new policy direction should be based not primarily on increases in military aid, but on strengthening the economy and the political structure of this newly democratic friend and ally.

I believe the Administration's proposal to sell Pakistan such an extraordinary amount of new military equipment -- at such a remarkable cost -- is leading our policy in precisely the wrong direction.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

101st CONGRESS
1st Session

H. J. RES. 368

To prohibit the proposed sale to Pakistan of F-16 aircraft.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

July 10, 1989

Mr. WELLS introduced the following joint resolution, which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

JOINT RESOLUTION

To prohibit the proposed sale to Pakistan of F-16 aircraft.

- 1 *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives*
- 2 *of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
- 3 That the proposed sale to Pakistan of 60 F-16A/B aircraft
- 4 and related defense articles and defense services which is de-
- 5 scribed in the certification submitted to the Congress pur-
- 6 suant to section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act on
- 7 July 11, 1989 (transmittal number 89-28), is prohibited.

a same time taking note of the realities of the strategic considerations in the region.

And that I think, Mr. Chairman, is about all that I want to say at this point. I would be pleased to try to respond to whatever questions you may have.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Weiss. After hearing your introductory comments about the Chairman, must say I found your presentation entirely persuasive. I do want to thank you very much for focusing attention on these questions and for sharing your concerns with the subcommittees.

I have a few questions I would like to ask, but let me yield first to my colleagues.

Mr. Torricelli, do you have any questions you want to put to Mr. Weiss?

Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Weiss, is it the fact that a sale is taking place, or the means by which it is financed and the cost to Pakistan, that is your principal concern? In other words, is it the opportunity cost, or resources in Pakistan which you would have the United States feel some responsibility for or is it the military implications for the United States that are the primary source of your concern?

Mr. WEISS. And even before that, if you will, my concern is about how this sale came about. I'm persuaded by what we learned on the scene, that it really occurred at the behest of representatives of our government. At least as much as at the request or desire of the Pakistani military or Pakistani government. Indeed, it happened between the death of General Zia and the election itself.

So that's my basic concern, is the role that we played in instigating this sale.

And then secondly, the consequences that it has both for regional concerns, as well as for setting back Prime Minister Bhutto's capacity to deal with the very fundamental problems that she wanted to address when she ran for office.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Would you be persuaded if it appeared that part of the reason for the support of the sale by the Pakistani government was the need for balance in the internal politics of Pakistan, and that indeed this sale assisted the transition to democracy because it was important to other elements of the realpolitik of Pakistan and, therefore, it would make some sense for stability and democratic transition?

Mr. WEISS. I would be persuaded of that if it were a limited sale. If you were limiting it to 18 or 20 aircraft perhaps. But 60 planes, I don't think that the ego of the Pakistani military requires 60 F-16s.

Mr. TORRICELLI. What is the leverage you're suggesting that those elements of this government who saw the sale in our own interest exercised over Pakistan in order to bring it to this point?

Mr. WEISS. Well, not having been privy to those discussions I really can't tell you except that it seems to me that military people have increased leverage with the military.

perfectly delighted. I'm perfectly delighted to have American money of that kind of sale.

What I'm objecting to is, in fact, the instigation of that sale by our people.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you. Mr. Goss?

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr. Weiss, I thought your testimony was as brilliant as I expected it to be and I think you have made a very persuasive case.

I have H.R. Res. 368 in front of me and I note that this bill proposes to prohibit sale of all 60 of the aircraft. Is that your intent?

Mr. WEISS. It is, because that's the only way that we can phrase the resolution. The Administration has requested a sale of 60; we don't have the power or the right to modify it. The resolution of disapproval, in fact, has to disapprove the sale that has been proposed.

Mr. GOSS. So if we have testimony later as to some other number, that might affect your decision on this?

Mr. WEISS. Listen, I would be very pleased if the Administration decided to cut it down to 15, 18, 20 aircraft. That might be the happiest way out.

Mr. GOSS. I understand your point and I think you've presented it well.

Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Snow?

Mr. SNOW. No questions.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Weiss, if it should turn out that there is insufficient support for your resolution to secure its adoption, how would you feel about a resolution of approval which would make the actual delivery of the F-16s contingent on a Presidential determination that Pakistan remains a democracy with a duly elected civilian government in charge of the country? Also, in that determination, the certification the President is required to make under the terms of the so-called Proser Amendment, namely, that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon and the continuation of American aid will make it less likely they will do so, would be applicable as well.

Mr. WEISS. And perhaps, an additional provision—as you probably know there have been discussions in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and in Der Spiegel that Pakistan has the capacity to transform these F-16s and some other planes as well to nuclear capable planes.

Finally, we believe that past and continued American support for Pakistan's conventional defenses reduces the likelihood that Pakistan will feel compelled to cross the nuclear threshold.

Thank you very much.

I would be pleased to respond to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hughes follows:]

STATEMENT BY
ARTHUR H. HUGHES
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR
NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEES ON
ARMS CONTROL, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, AND SCIENCE
AND
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1966

CHAIRMAN FASCELL, CHAIRMAN BOLAND, MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEES, I AM INDEED PLEASED TO JOIN MY COLLEAGUE FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WAS. SCHAFER, IN WHAT IS THE FIRST APPEARANCE BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE FOR BOTH OF US IN OUR NEW ROLES AS DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARIES IN OUR RESPECTIVE DEPARTMENTS.

TO SET THE STAGE FOR TODAY'S HEARING, I WOULD LIKE TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE PAKISTANI REQUEST TO BUY AN ADDITIONAL 60 F-16 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. THE REQUEST WAS FORMALLY SUBMITTED TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN OCTOBER 1965 AND, AS YOU ARE AWARE, INCLUDED IN THIS YEAR'S "JAVIER REPORT," THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROJECTION OF DEFENSE SALES THAT WERE ELIGIBLE FOR APPROVAL DURING 1969. AT THE TIME OF THE MARCH HEARING, THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT YET DECIDED TO APPROVE THE PAKISTANI REQUEST. WE USED THAT HEARING TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD USE IN REACHING A DECISION AND SAID THAT WE CONSIDERED THAT SESSION TO BE THE BEGINNING OF A DIALOGUE WITH THE CONGRESS ON THE F-16 REQUEST.

BASIC MODERNIZATION PLANS. THE LEADING CANDIDATE IS THE FRENCH MIRAGE 2000 THAT IS BEING MARKETING AGGRESSIVELY IN THE REGION. THE MIRAGE 2000 IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED COMPARABLE TO THE F-16 IN AN AIR SUPERIORITY ROLE BUT IS PROBABLY A BETTER STRIKE AIRCRAFT, GIVEN ITS GREATER RANGE, SPEED, AND SERVICE CEILING. ACCORDINGLY, WE VIEW THE ACQUISITION OF F-16'S AS A MORE STABILIZING DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE REGION THAN WOULD BE THE MIRAGE 2000.

THE COMMITTEE HAS INQUIRED WHETHER SOME OTHER MIX OF AIR DEFENSE ASSETS OTHER THAN MORE F-16'S WOULD NOT MEET PAKISTAN'S REQUIREMENTS. OTHER WITNESSES HAVE SUGGESTED THAT A COMBINATION OF SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES, MORE CAPABLE AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES, AND IMPROVED EARLY WARNING CAPABILITY WOULD DO THE JOB. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT IMPROVEMENTS IN THESE AREAS WOULD BE USEFUL, BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT, EITHER SINGLY OR IN COMBINATION, THEY ARE A SUBSTITUTE FOR MAINTAINING THE CURRENT FORCE BALANCE WITH INDIA. IT SHOULD BE APPRECIATED THAT MANY CONSIDER THAT ACQUISITION OF AN AWACS-TYPE AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING CAPABILITY BY EITHER INDIA OR PAKISTAN WOULD BE DESTABILIZING, SINCE THAT WOULD INTRODUCE A NEW CAPABILITY IN THE REGION. ALSO, PAKISTAN TODAY POSSESSES THE MOST ADVANCED AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE THAT THE USG IS WILLING TO RELEASE OUTSIDE OF A FEW SELECTED ALLIES.

THE COMMITTEE ALSO ASKED ABOUT THE NUCLEAR DELIVERY CAPABILITY OF F-16 AIRCRAFT. IN ORDER TO DELIVER A NUCLEAR DEVICE WITH ANY REASONABLE DEGREE OF ACCURACY AND SAFETY, IT FIRST WOULD BE NECESSARY TO REPLACE THE ENTIRE MIRING PACKAGE IN THE AIRCRAFT. IN ADDITION TO BUILDING A WEAPONS CARRIAGE MOUNT,

ONE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO RE-DO THE FIRE CONTROL CONTROLS, THE STORES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, AND MISSION COMPUTER SOFTWARE TO ALLOW THE WEAPON TO BE DROPPED ACCURATELY AND TO REDISTRIBUTE WEIGHT AND BALANCE AFTER RELEASE. WE BELIEVE THIS CAPABILITY FAR EXCEEDS THE STATE OF THE ART IN PAKISTAN AND COULD ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH A MAJOR RELEASE OF DATA AND INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT FROM THE U.S.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE BASIC ISSUE FACING THE CONGRESS IN RELATION TO THE PROPOSED SALE OF ADDITIONAL F-16'S TO PAKISTAN IS THE SAME CRITERION THAT GUIDED THE ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION: IS THE SALE IN THE OVERALL NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES. THE SALE OBVIOUSLY WOULD HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON U.S.-PAKISTANI RELATIONS, DEMONSTRATING AS IT WOULD A CONTINUED U.S. INTEREST IN AND CONCERN FOR PAKISTAN'S LEGITIMATE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. WE HAVE SOUGHT TO REASSURE PAKISTAN THAT WE ARE SUPPORTIVE OF PAKISTAN'S NEEDS IN AND OF THEMSELVES AND NOT MERELY AS AN ADJUNCT TO OUR JOINT OPPOSITION TO THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. WE REINFORCE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PAKISTANI MILITARY IN THE ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS OF THE DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP TO PROVIDE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY THROUGH OUR CONTINUED MILITARY ASSISTANCE, BY BOTH OUR FMS FINANCING AND WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE ADVANCED WEAPONS SYSTEMS. BY HELPING TO MAINTAIN PAKISTAN'S DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES, WE CONTRIBUTE TO THE SELF CONFIDENCE THAT PAKISTAN REQUIRES TO ENABLE IT TO TAKE RISKS FOR REDUCTION OF TENSIONS IN THE REGION. OUR PAST AND CONTINUED SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN MODERNIZING PAKISTAN'S CONVENTIONAL MILITARY

CAPABILITIES ALSO REDUCES THE LIKELIHOOD THAT PAKISTAN WILL FEEL COMPELLED TO CROSS THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THRESHOLD.

IN THIS CONNECTION, WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY THE RECENT SERIES OF INDO-PAKISTANI HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS, AND WE BELIEVE THAT THE F-16 SALE WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PAKISTAN'S READINESS TO CONTINUE ON THIS TRACK.

MR. SOLARZ. I thank you very much.

I'm pleased to note that the Chairman of the Full Committee Mr. Fascell, has arrived. He also Chairs the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science with which we are jointly holding this hearing.

Let me yield to him at this time.

Chairman FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me add my warm welcome to both Ms. Schaffer and Mr. Hughes in their appearance before the committee.

I have three issues which I can address to each of you. In that the Indian government allegedly has an Air Force superiority ratio of three to one, I would presume there to be no real Indian objection or diplomatic inhibition which might be forthcoming with regard to this proposed sale.

Secondly, I'm not quite sure that I clearly understand the financial aspects that surround this transaction.

Finally, I assume that we are relying upon the strictest of assurances from the Head of State of Pakistan with regard to Pakistan's potential ability to produce nuclear weapons as not being a bar toward proceeding with this particular sale.

Ms. SCHAFER. Mr. Chairman, with respect to your first question on the Indian government position, as I said, they have told us that they are concerned about the sale. The public reaction in India has been much more restrained than we had noted in previous arms sales transactions with Pakistan.

And as I said, after thinking carefully about the Indian government concerns we concluded that the sale should go ahead and that it would not deter the governments of Pakistan and India from their present strong commitment to try to improve relations. But it would furthermore not impair the improvement and relations which I consider is entrained between the United States and India.

As to the finances, we have been told that the government of Pakistan has set aside \$200 million per year to cover the cost of the F-16s. And that this represents essentially the funding that they had previously earmarked for a planned upgrade and co-production of some F-7s.

As far as the nuclear issue is concerned, as you know the President Amendment requires the President to certify by October 1st of every year, and we will be starting that process shortly.

Chairman FASCELL. But isn't it correct that the US government is relying upon the representations made by the Pakistani Head of State?

Ms. SCHAFER. We obviously place great value on the fact that Benazir Bhutto told the Congress and the world that Pakistan does not have, nor intends, to produce a nuclear weapon.

Chairman FASCELL. Thank you very much.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you.

Mr. Goss?

Mr. Goss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no questions at this time.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Torricelli?

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Hughes, perhaps you could describe for me the impact on the Pakistan military of making this financial com-

ment. What opportunity costs does this have? May be other significant needs of the Pakistani military, to commit 200 million for a number of years?

Mr. HUGHES. Thank you.

As I indicated, the Pakistani Air Force now has about 170 obsolete F-6 aircraft in its inventory. They have been planning for some time to replace those aircraft and have begun to look at various possibilities, various alternatives for doing so.

The first alternative that they studied, and had tentatively decided to go with, was to work out an arrangement with the Chinese to acquire and co-produce F-7s, which are MIG-21 variants and include upgraded avionics—western avionics.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Hughes, I understand that part of it and just for the interest of time since there is a vote on the floor, the thrust of my question was: what things that might have been planned in the Pakistan military that might also be important to the security interest of the United States given events in neighboring Afghanistan will they likely have to forego in order to afford this sale? Is that question an element of consideration for the United States?

Mr. HUGHES. I'm sorry about the time, I was going back only to set the stage.

Actually, they have been planning for this for some time. They have set aside the \$200 million a year for this; this has been included in their long-term planning. So the short answer to your question is, no, they are not having to forego any other planned changes in the military as a result of this sale.

Mr. TORRICELLI. For example, many of us would hope that they were going to buy the M-1, does this sale not impact on other things that they might have purchased for other plans?

Mr. HUGHES. We had an indication from them last week that they're reconsidering their previously stated interest in obtaining the M-1.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

As you know, I believe very strongly that this sale is in the foreign policy and the security interest of the United States. I think it is well conceived and well considered and I strongly support it.

I have no further questions at this time.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Torricelli.

Ms. SNOWE, do you have any questions? We can squeeze a few more in before the second bells. I'm going to come back after the vote.

Ms. SNOWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You obviously heard the earlier discussion concerning the number: why 60? And is it possible to accept less? I know the notification of the sale has already gone forward, but I would like to hear your reasoning for the number 60 on the F-16s.

Mr. HUGHES. Thank you, Ms. Snowe.

The number 60 was arrived at after careful study by the Pakistani Government and the Pakistani military. They plan to replace the 170 old aircraft with 60 F-16s and approximately 75 F-7 MPs which they would acquire from the Chinese. So this would not be a one-to-one replacement.

The F-16s would be at the high end of capability and the F-7s at the low end. We understand that the Pakistani military would

afford them. They plan to purchase with Pakistan's own money that they had set aside originally for the F-7 upgrade. And we are responding to their request.

I would just like to say here that I am certain that the activities of our defense representatives in Pakistan were correct in responding to Pakistan requests for information as to what possibilities exist to meet what Pakistan considers to be its requirements toward their defense.

Ms. SNOWE. How many F-16s have we sold in the past to the Pakistanis?

Mr. HUGHES. We've sold 40.

Ms. SNOWE. 40. And what has been their track record in terms of complying with the agreements—the contractual agreements?

Mr. HUGHES. Excuse me, I'm told that we've also sold 11 additional F-16s, in part for attrition requirements.

I'm sorry, would you repeat the second part of your question.

Ms. SNOWE. What has been Pakistan's track record in complying with our contractual agreements?

Mr. HUGHES. Very good; no problems.

Ms. SNOWE. Are you satisfied with the assurances that they would not provide a nuclear capability?

Mr. HUGHES. Yes, we are.

Ms. SNOWE. Would that be in writing as well?

Ms. SCHAFER. It's a condition of the sale for the new F-16s.

Ms. SNOWE. So it would be part of the contract?

Ms. SCHAFER. That's right.

Ms. SNOWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Ms. Snowe.

The subcommittees will stand in recess for approximately 10 or 15 minutes while we go to vote. Then, if you will permit me, I have a few questions I would like to ask.

[Whereupon, a recess was taken.]

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Leach, do you have any questions you want to ask at this time?

Mr. LEACH. Not at this point, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Clarke, do you have any questions?

Mr. CLARKE. No.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Lagomarsino, you're doing double duty here today.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. As you are, Mr. Chairman.

I have some questions, I don't know if any of these have been asked before. If they have, will the witnesses just so indicate, because I can read it in the record.

During deliberations on the sale of refurbished F-5Es to Honduras a couple of years ago Congress supported the sale because the Honduran Air Force was a key part of Honduras defense and deterrent against Nicaragua's far larger army.

Is the situation similar with regard to Pakistan? In other words, is a strong Air Force rather than a large Army or Navy the key part of Pakistan's defense?

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. Lagomarsino, yes, the Pakistanis would consider that the Air Force is a key part of their defense. The mission of the Air Force is to participate in a country's overall deterrent