United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6250
March 8, 1993

The Hon. Les Aspin
Secretary
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Several press reports have recently alleged that "U.S. commandos" are engaging in joint exercises in Pakistan. On February 15, 1993, Pakistani foreign secretary reportedly stated that the exercises were enabling Pakistani troops "... to get used to the latest warfare techniques and technologies." Secretary Kanju also reportedly stated that there "was no Jew in the group" of U.S. commandos. These comments follow the Bush administration's confirmation last year that the State Department was approving licenses for commercial arms sales to Pakistan, including sales of spare parts for F-16 aircraft -- an aircraft identified in recent CIA testimony before this Committee as Pakistan's likely nuclear delivery system.

I am writing to request some answers to the following questions:

1. What specific military techniques and technologies have been provided to Pakistan since September 1990? How were they funded? Do these transfers constitute "assistance" or "technology" as such terms are used in sec. 620 E-6 of the Foreign Assistance Act?

2. Did Mr. Kanju make the reported remark about there being "no Jew" in the group of U.S. commandos? Has the U.S. military ever excluded members of the Jewish faith from participating in any military activities in Pakistan or any other country?

3. Does the Department support the position taken by the Bush Administration that commercial arms sales to Pakistan (including spare parts for F-16 and C-130 aircraft, both of which were identified by the CIA at the Committee's hearing of February 24, 1993, as capable of delivering Pakistan's nuclear weapons) are fully consistent with the prohibitions of the Pressler Amendment?

4. A Defense official testified before a House subcommittee on August 2, 1989, that Pakistan would have to modify substantially their F-16's for nuclear delivery purposes, and that Pakistan did not possess the capability to perform such modifications -- yet CIA Director Robert Gates testified on January 15, 1992, before this Committee that no such modifications would be needed for the plane to be used for such a purpose -- what is the position of the Department today on this issue?

I would appreciate expedited consideration of this request.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

John Glenn
Chairman

JHG/kp

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

13 APR 1993

In reply refer to:
I-93/45213

Senator John Glenn
Chairman, Committee
on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in reply to your letter of March 8 in which you asked several specific questions regarding Pakistan.

The Government of Pakistan has told us that the remarks attributed to Minister of State Kanju were made while the Minister was speaking in the Assembly to defend the presence of U.S. forces in Pakistan for a joint exercise. He apparently made this comment in an attempt to cut off hostile questioning from a member of an Islamic fundamentalist party. We have informed the Pakistani Government that, whatever the reason for the statement, it was offensive and inappropriate. You may be assured that the Department of Defense has never excluded any U.S. service member from participation in any activity on the basis of religion.

With the exception of equipment provided under UN auspices for relief operations in Somalia pursuant to separate statutory authority, the U.S. Government has not provided any military equipment or technology to Pakistan since the restrictions imposed by the Pressler Amendment took effect in October 1990. Commercial sales of military equipment and technology purchased with Pakistani national funds have continued, but these have been carefully screened through the export licensing process to prevent allowing any new capabilities, major defense equipment, or upgrades to existing systems to be sold. With regard to this policy, this department must defer to the Department of State which has sole authority to approve commercial export licenses under the Arms Export Control Act. We will, of course, continue to observe the prohibition on U.S. Government-funded assistance and Foreign Military Sales of military equipment or technology.

The 1989 Department of Defense testimony concerning Pakistan's inability to deliver nuclear weapons with the F-16 without considerable modification was based on the assessment that weapon design had not advanced to the point where a nuclear weapon could be safely carried on the aircraft. In addition, Pakistan's F-16 weapons computer system is programmed to employ conventional weapons only, and the assessment in 1989 and still today is that

Pakistan does not have the computer coding skills to make the necessary modifications. CIA Director Gates' assessment several years later was that Pakistan could conceivably reduce the weapon size sufficiently to attach it to the F-16 and maintain flight. In any event, the F-16 weapons computer system will still not permit employment of nuclear weapons. Pakistan could, however, theoretically attach a weapon and deliver it to a target with their F-16s, or any other aircraft in their inventory, if arming and fuzing procedures were accomplished before takeoff, and safety and placement accuracy were not considered.

I hope the above information is useful to you and the Committee. Please contact the Department again if we can be of further assistance on this matter.

Sincerely,

William T. Pendley

William T. Pendley
for ASD/ISA

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COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6250

March 1, 1993

The Hon. R. James Woolsey
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr Woolsey:

I am writing to thank you for participating in the hearing of this Committee last Wednesday on "Proliferation Threats of the 1990's" and to provide a list of follow-up questions for written responses. I hope that you will attempt to provide unclassified responses to as many of these questions as possible. A substantial majority of these questions was provided in draft form to your staff last month and I am sure that responses have already been prepared for most of them. In addition, I am attaching additional questions that have been submitted by other members of the Committee.

Also, I also would like to express my appreciation to the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) for their efforts in obtaining and translating the lengthy Russian intelligence survey of weapons proliferation developments that was released at the hearing in English. Please extend to Mr. Wayne R. Schreiner, the Director of FBIS, my thanks for a job well done. My staff has for many years relied upon products issued by FBIS and the professionals in that organization deserve some credit for their long and distinguished record of achievement.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

John Glenn

John Glenn
Chairman

cc: Mr. Wayne R. Schreiner

JHG/rjr