

# **CLOSE AIR SUPPORT**

POGO CAS CONFERENCE

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**Joint Tactics,  
Techniques,  
and Procedures for  
Close Air Support  
(CAS)**

## **THE VALUE OF EXPERIENCE**

*“Among military men it is a commonplace that interallied and interservice operations pose difficulties in execution. **Differences in equipment, in doctrine, in attitude, and outlook stemming from contrasting past experience all inhibit and complicate harmonious interaction.** Past successes, however, have shown that these difficulties can be overcome where determination is present and effective procedures have been applied by properly trained troops. Experience also shows that armed forces . . . have been slow to hammer out the necessary procedures. Often, corrective steps have been achieved only after many failures in battle.”*

**In no area of interservice operations has this phenomenon been more pronounced than in the matter of Close Air Support.”**

*Excerpt from Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support,  
I.B. Holley, JR., B.F. Cooley, Office of Air Force History, 1990*

## JP 3 – 09.3 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

This publication provides joint doctrine for planning and executing CAS.

CAS is air action by fixed-wing (FW) and rotary-wing (RW) aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces, and requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.

84,243 Words / 275 Pages

# CAS MISSION PREPARATION

Preparation consists of activities by the unit before execution to improve its ability to conduct operations including, but not limited to, the following: *rehearsals, precombat/communication checks, and movement.*

# CAS EXECUTION

It is critical for joint terminal attack controller s and combat operations center/tactical operations center elements to coordinate their efforts prior to each CAS engagement.

Key issues such as battle tracking, target nomination, airspace deconfliction and coordination, synchronization, weapons release authority, tactical risk assessment, types of TAC, and which JTAC/FAC(A)

**CONDITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE CAS**

**EFFECTIVE TRAINING & PROFICIENCY**

**PLANNING & INTEGRATION**

**COMMAND & CONTROL**

**AIR SUPERIORITY**

**TARGET MARKING**

**STREAMLINED /FLEXIBLE PROCEDURES**

**APPROPRIATE ORDNANCE**

**FAVORABLE ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS (?)**

**(EXPERIENCED PILOTS/FACs : CEM)**

ASSURED PRODUCT of FIXED WING CAS

“ADSMAF”

Air Delivered Save My Ass Fires

*APPRECIATED WHEN NEEDED BUT SHOULD  
NOT HAVE BEEN NECESSARY*

*Its the Best One Can Expect from **BIG** WAR Airforces Designed  
for **Deep** Strike/Interdiction*



# WHAT INFANTRY DESIRES: MAS

Continuous overhead “presence” of perceptive air crews working as an integral partner with the ground combat element. *A virtually organic airborne partner who knows the Commander’s Intent and (w/o interruption of ground maneuver progress), provides:*

**BNOC Surveillance/Recce/Comms/NAV Assist  
in Rough Terrain (*ambush avoidance*)**

**Immediate Light Fires When Desired**

**FAC(A) Coordination of CAS/Arty/Naval Fires**

INDEPENDENT RESEARCH  
CAS WORKSHOPS and INTERVIEWS (1985-90)

OSD (AT&L) FUNDED STUDY Oct 2000  
“Recovering TACAIR’s Lost Battlespace: BNOC”  
*Origin of term Maneuver Air Support (MAS)*

Why we abandoned the term CAS  
*Disengage from 70 years of Political Baggage*

# THE PROBLEM

The kind of air support needed by ground forces, particularly light elements which must execute maneuver warfare tactics in enemy territory, does not appear to be possible with the proposed tactical air forces. This is especially the case for troops inserted into rough terrain beneath an overcast sky. Recent experience has provided evidence of the problem and some clues as to the nature of the solution.

# The Stars of Afghanistan

- AC-130 Gunship (when present)
- A-10 Warthog (when present)

Why are they so popular??

# AVAILABILITY/RESPONSE

- Response has declined from 5 -15 minutes for Patton in Europe, WWII to 45 minutes in Korea to an hour and a half in Vietnam to 72 hours (worst case). The need is for “*immediate*” response.
- Air cannot be absolutely counted on when needed. Often it is needed from the outset of an operation.
- C2 is Rigid; certainly not Adaptive

*Reference annual Joint CAS Office Reports  
from training exercises.*

# MOVING BATTLESPACE BUBBLE

“The decidedly non-linear nature of Marine Corps STOM and the Army Interim Combat Brigade and Objective Force Concepts stretch the ability to accommodate needed fire support. We need to go to a moving bubble of battlespace within which these forces can maneuver in a non-linear fashion”.

Col. Gary W. Anderson, USMC; Dir. of the Marine Corps Battle Lab, Quantico,  
Va. 07/10/00


What is the composition of the moving battlespace bubble and what is its source of “virtually” organic fires?

STUDY FINDING-Grunts want/need:  
Continuous Overhead PRESENCE of  
Manned Air

to help them: see, communicate,  
perform local recce, advise, provide  
**instant suppressive light fires** on  
“speed bump” levels of resistance  
and control/coordinate other external  
fires (even on overcast days)

# DoDD 5100.1 Timeline

- Major Changes to DoDD 5100.1 or Precursor
- Minor Changes to DoDD 5100.1 or Precursor





**“WAR” IS ON THE GROUND; FOCUS TACAIR on  
WINNING WHERE IT COUNTS: PRESERVE the A-10  
and Its Unique USAF Personnel Support Base**



**LEGISLATE  
DEVELOPMENT of  
an A-10  
FOLLOW-ON for  
MAS and  
Adaptive C2**

**WHEN YOU SEE THIS IMAGE ON ENEMY  
STRUCTURES, OUR “GRUNTS” ARE WINNING !**

*THE WAY IT WAS THE LAST TIME WE WON ONE.....*